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Abstract 
British Columbia’s current policy package is insufficient to meet the province’s 2030, 
2040, or 2050 greenhouse gas emissions targets. To design and assess different policy 
pathways to close this emissions gap, I used the CIMS energy-economy model. The first 
target-achieving pathway emphasized the carbon tax due to its economic efficiency. The 
second pathway tightened existing regulations with flexible compliance options, including 
the low carbon fuel standard, the zero-emission vehicles mandate, the clean electricity 
standard and the clean gas standard. I found that meeting the targets with either policy 
pathway results in similar technology and energy-use outcomes. This suggests that B.C. 
can choose to emphasize either carbon pricing, or flexible regulations to close its 
emissions gap. This range of options enables B.C. policymakers to consider other 
criteria, notably the political acceptability of their climate policy alternatives. 
Keywords:  British Columbia; Climate policy; Energy-economy modeling; Low Carbon 
Fuel Standard; Zero-emission vehicles mandate; LNG 
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Chapter 1.  
 
Introduction 
Since 1989, British Columbia has sought to establish itself as a climate policy 
leader. In 2007, it became one of few jurisdictions in North America to legislate an 
ambitious set of climate targets (Government of British Columbia, 2007): a 40% 
emissions reduction by 2030, 60% reduction by 2040, and 80% by 2050, all relative to 
2007 levels. To meet these targets, the government implemented a series of compulsory 
emissions reductions policies between 2007 and 2008. This included a suite of 
regulations, notable among them the Clean Electricity Standard, the Low Carbon Fuel 
Standard (LCFS), tighter energy efficiency standards, and a mandatory carbon-neutral 
offset program for all emissions from the public sector. In addition, B.C. introduced a 
broad-based carbon tax. The Clean Electricity Standard and the carbon tax were the first 
policies of their kind in North America. 
British Columbia’s compulsory policies succeeded in establishing it as a North 
American leader in climate policy alongside California (Jaccard, 2012). However, B.C. 
has yet to develop and implement policies that will achieve its GHG reduction targets. 
The government stabilized the stringencies of the existing policies between 2012 and 
2018. In 2018, the government launched CleanBC, another commitment to reducing 
emissions. As part of this package, the government increased the stringencies of 
existing policies and added additional policies to the mix. Independent analysis of the 
current policy package (Navius Research, 2017) found that it will not meet the 2030, 
2040, or 2050 emissions targets. Thus, the provincial government continues to assess 
options to further reduce emissions by increasing stringencies on existing policies and 
implementing new policies. 
While none of B.C.’s climate plans since 1989 have been estimated to meet the 
intended emissions targets, there has been little academic work aimed at evaluating 
policy pathways that will. Past research exploring policy alternatives to meet emission 
reduction targets has been done at the national level (Christoph & Rutherford, 2012; 
Davis & Kumar, 2018; Jaccard et al., 2004; Vass, 2016), but research at a national level 
does not necessarily provide a regional government (with its own climate targets) clear 
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paths for emissions reductions. B.C.’s climate policies are a popular case study for 
economists and climate policy analysts (Beck et al., 2015; Lacroix & Richards, 2015; 
Navius Research, 2016; Rhodes & Jaccard, 2013; Rivers & Jaccard, 2005a) but there 
are few studies that specifically investigate how these policy packages can be altered to 
achieve emissions targets. Such exploratory research has centered on individual sectors 
(Lepitzki & Axsen, 2018; Talebian et al., 2018), rather than on policy packages that could 
be applied to the entire B.C. economy. 
I aim to fill this research gap by exploring pathways to meet British Columbia’s 
GHG reduction targets for the key years of 2030, 2040, and 2050, using different 
assumptions of external demand for B.C.’s natural gas and the intensity of climate 
policies in other jurisdictions, notably those that comprise the province’s major trading 
partners. To explore possible pathways for emissions reductions, I model a series of 
policy runs to examine how different combinations of policies would influence the 
economy from the present day until the year 2050. To model these policy runs I use 
CIMS, an energy-economy model that represents the capital stocks in an economy and 
simulates their turnover and competition with one another over time. CIMS features a 
high level of technological detail, allowing me to examine how climate policies might 
influence the market shares of specific technologies into the future. CIMS also features a 
parameter that allows the user to represent consumer values not included in capital and 
operating costs, such as convenience and reliability. This sets it apart from the many 
technology-rich models that do not take consumer preferences explicitly into account 
(Rivers & Jaccard, 2005b). 
To provide further insight into the outcomes of a policy package that would 
achieve the climate targets, I explore alternative policy packages dominated by two 
different policy types. My first policy package retains the current set of policies but 
focuses on steadily increasing the carbon tax as the main policy going forward. The 
carbon tax places a uniform price on fossil fuel-originated CO2 emissions in B.C. A 
carbon tax applied across the economy is theoretically one of the most economically 
efficient policies for reducing emissions, alongside cap-and-trade programs (Goulder & 
Parry, 2008). To offset the costs of the tax when it was first applied in the period 2008-
2012, the B.C. government simultaneously cut income and corporate taxes by a near-
equivalent amount to ensure government revenue-neutrality. This policy allowed 
taxpayers to reduce their overall tax burden by reducing their emissions relative to 
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others by their technology choices for vehicles, furnaces and other end-use devices, and 
by substituting high-emissions goods and services for low-emission alternatives (i.e. 
using public transit as an alternative to driving) (Jaccard, 2012). The visible nature of 
carbon taxes and the strong opposition they provoke from some percentage of 
constituents (Rhodes et al., 2017; Rhodes & Jaccard, 2013) may be a factor in 
preventing policymakers from raising them to the level necessary to meet emissions 
targets. However, the economic efficiency of a carbon tax makes it a useful policy to 
model at a high stringency, as it can illustrate an economically efficient outcome given 
the current policy package. 
My second alternative policy package keeps the current set of policies but 
focuses on a suite of regulations (of increasing stringency) to meet the climate targets. 
Evidence suggests that regulations have in the past encountered less public opposition 
than the carbon tax for an equivalent or greater amount of GHG reductions (Rhodes et 
al., 2017). For example, Rhodes and Jaccard (2013), found that The Clean Electricity 
Standard, which requires that a given percentage of new electricity is generated by zero-
emission sources, resulted in far less public opposition despite a higher estimated cost 
per tonne of reductions. They suggest that the lack of public opposition may be due to 
the policy’s low visibility, or low awareness by the public of the higher costs of regulation 
relative to the carbon tax. 
The Clean Electricity Standard is a prominent example of a regulation that does 
not prescribe a specific technological outcome, thereby allowing electricity generators to 
decide the technology they will adopt to comply with the regulation. Throughout this 
thesis, I refer to the Clean Electricity Standard and other regulations that do not 
prescribe specific technologies as “flexible regulations.” To meet the climate targets in 
this package, I emphasize the most “flexible” of the existing regulations and design 
additional regulations for sectors that are only covered by the carbon tax. While there is 
no guarantee that this package will not be met with political opposition, it presents an 
alternative decarbonization strategy for policymakers to consider. 
In summary, I model four different runs: 
1. Business-as-usual (BAU): All policies currently implemented at their 2020 
stringencies. 
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2. Current and Announced Policies (CAP): All policies with quantified 
stringencies that have been implemented and announced by the B.C. 
government as of December 2018, the date when the government 
presented its most recent major climate plan, called CleanBC. Policies 
are modeled at their announced stringencies for the years 2020 to 2030 
and assumed to remain constant after that, unless the government has 
specified otherwise. 
3. Current and Announced Policies + Carbon Pricing (CAP + Carbon 
Pricing): All policies in the Current and Announced Policies run combined 
with a rising carbon tax whose trajectory is set to achieve the 2030, 2040, 
and 2050 emissions targets.  
4. Current and Announced Policies + Flexible Regulations (CAP + Flexible 
Regulations): All policies in the Current and Announced Policies run, plus 
flexible regulations whose rising stringencies are set to ensure that the 
province achieves the 2030, 2040, and 2050 GHG targets. 
I analyze the results of these scenarios by comparing the technological outcomes 
of each sector across scenarios. This includes examining how specific categories of 
technologies change over time, as well as how fuel use shifts to meet demand despite 
growing restrictions on carbon. 
Due to the linear progression of the emissions targets, every run intended to 
meet the emissions targets in 2030 and 2050 meets or exceeds the 2040 targets. When 
discussing the results, I focus on B.C.’s 2030 and 2050 emissions targets. The reasons 
for this are twofold: (1) Exploring the technological outcomes for two target years instead 
of three removes redundancies from my discussion. (2) I suggest that it is reasonable to 
assume that B.C. will collaborate, to some extent, with the federal government on 
climate policy. Canada’s federal government has climate targets for 2030 and 2050 and 
is implementing an overlapping policy package to achieve them. To provide analysis that 
is most useful for both a provincial and national context, I focus discussion on the targets 
that both jurisdictions have in common. I do not assume that B.C.’s targets will align 
precisely with the national targets. Although B.C. will be part of Canada’s efforts to go 
net-zero in 2050, their targets may differ in the intervening years. Moreover, to achieve 
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an economically efficient outcome in 2050 at the national level, B.C. may need to reduce 
more or less emissions relative to the rest of Canada. 
To add further complexity to the task of meeting the emissions targets, B.C. is 
promoting the growth of its natural gas industry1. Favourable market conditions have 
motivated some energy companies to expand their activities in B.C., as natural gas can 
be cooled into liquid natural gas (LNG) and exported overseas. By 2015, companies had 
presented 18 proposals for LNG projects to export natural gas by tanker to Asian 
markets. Since then, momentum in the Canadian LNG industry has waned. A 
combination of falling natural gas prices in 2014, a surplus of LNG liquefaction capacity, 
and high transportation costs resulted in a poor economic case for most proposals 
(Gomes, 2015). As of 2020, one project is in development while three others remain in 
the proposal stage. 
Successive provincial governments have voiced their support for the industry, 
citing economic benefits for the province including jobs and increased provincial revenue 
(Government of British Columbia, 2018). However, natural gas production and 
processing into transportable LNG can be an emissions-intensive process depending on 
the form of energy that is used to liquify the natural gas (Luke & Noble, 2019). Major 
LNG expansion without technologies to prevent or remove upstream emissions in the 
extraction, processing, transporting and liquefaction phases could contribute 
substantially to provincial emissions. To accommodate this uncertainty, I run each set of 
policies under two different scenarios which I call High LNG and Low LNG. 
To this end, my goal is to assess how alternative policy packages can achieve 
B.C.’s climate targets, while also gauging how the expansion of LNG might impact B.C.’s 
ability to meet those targets. Thus, my thesis addresses the following three objectives:  
1. Evaluate the emissions reductions and possible technological outcomes 
resulting from the implementation of the government’s current policy 
package of 2018-2020 (which thus far is projected not to achieve the B.C. 
government’s GHG emission targets). 
 
1 For a more in-depth description of global LNG markets up to the year 2018, see Winter et al. 
(2018). For a detailed description of the Canadian natural gas industry up to 2015, see Gomes 
(2015).   
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2. Compare outcomes when B.C.’s climate policy package is made more 
stringent to meet the emission targets, first, with an emphasis on 
increased carbon pricing and, second, with an emphasis on flexible 
regulations. 
3. Explore the implications for achieving emission targets from greater or 
lesser provincial production of natural gas for export in the form of LNG. 
In Chapter 2 I provide further background into types of policy, policy evaluation 
criteria, and B.C.’s climate policy context. In Chapter 3 I provide an overview of the 
model I used to conduct this research. In Chapter 4 I detail my key assumptions for 
representing B.C.’s economy and for each policy package. I present and discuss the 
results of my modeling exercise in Chapter 5. Finally, I summarize my findings in 
Chapter 6. 
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Chapter 2. Background 
To provide some context to the methodology I used for this study, I provide 
background information in the following three sections. In section 2.1, I give an overview 
of the types of climate policy and discuss policy evaluation criteria. In section 2.2., I offer 
a brief summary of how the B.C. government uses these policies in its climate plans. 
Finally, in section 2.3., I describe energy-economy models, their advantages and 
disadvantages, and how they can be used to provide insight for policymakers by 
simulating alternative policy packages. 
2.1. Types of climate change policy 
GHG reduction policies can be characterized in terms of their degree of 
“compulsoriness” (Jaccard & Bataille, 2002). Firms and households subject to 
compulsory policies are obligated to pay financial charges for their carbon emissions or 
pay financial penalties for non-compliance with regulations requiring technology, energy 
or emission outcomes. Compulsory policies can vary in scope. Carbon pricing policies, 
for example, will typically apply to the entire economy’s GHG emissions unless full or 
partial exemptions are granted for specific sectors. As mentioned previously, carbon 
pricing places a specific price on GHG emissions (usually $/tonne CO2 equivalent), 
thereby disincentivizing high-emission activities. Carbon pricing can take the form of a 
carbon tax, which applies a price on emissions, or a cap-and-trade system, which caps 
emissions and subsequently allows firms to trade permits for allowable emissions, the 
price of which has the same effect as a carbon tax in incentivizing decarbonization.  
While the carbon price is shown by economists to be the most economically 
efficient method of reducing emissions, researchers also determined that the price would 
need to be at least $150/tonne CO2e for Canada to achieve its 2030 emissions target 
(Carbon Pricing Leadership Coalition, 2017; World Bank Group, 2019). Without the rest 
of Canada collaborating to reduce emissions to the same degree, the carbon price 
necessary to meet B.C.’s emissions targets is likely to be even higher, given that BC’s 
hydropower-dominated electricity system is already decarbonized, thereby reducing the 
opportunities for high percentage reductions. Furthermore, a unified, global carbon price 
is important for the economic survival of emissions-intensive, trade-exposed (EITE) 
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industries (Bumpus, 2015). Otherwise, EITE industries that incur increased costs due to 
one jurisdiction’s climate policies are at a competitive disadvantage relative to their 
unregulated counterparts in some other jurisdictions. Conscious of this vulnerability, 
jurisdictions around the world have applied separate or modified policies to EITE 
industries in an effort to induce some emissions reductions while at the same time 
alleviating the effect of climate policies on the production costs of these firms (Dobson & 
Winter, 2018). 
Regulations are another compulsory policy option. Prescriptive, or “command-
and-control,” regulations stipulate a specific action that must be taken by each firm or 
household. Policymakers have used regulations to address other environmental issues, 
such as water and air pollution (Huffman, 1994). For instance, a regulation might specify 
that a polluting industrial facility install scrubbers in its chimneys. Command-and-control 
regulations are a common policy for environmental protection because they allow 
policymakers to target easily identifiable damaging actions and technologies. However, 
economists generally consider prescriptive regulations to be inefficient. Prescribing a 
specific compliance mechanism disregards the heterogeneous costs of firms resulting 
from the age of their equipment, locational advantages and technology differences. This 
results in a higher overall cost to society, wasting resources that could have been used 
in other, more beneficial ways. Additionally, prescriptive regulations do not incentivize 
firms to perform beyond what is mandated by the regulation (Goulder & Parry, 2008). 
To mitigate some of these economic inefficiencies, policymakers in recent 
decades have increasingly tried, where possible, to implement “flexible” regulations. 
B.C.’s Clean Electricity Standard, as mentioned earlier, is one such regulation, currently 
requiring that 93% of new electricity generation be from zero-emissions sources (B.C. 
Hydro, B.C.’s utility, currently exceeds this objective, sourcing 98% of generation from 
renewable resources). The prescription of “zero-emissions” rather than “renewable” 
allows electricity suppliers to choose from a larger range of options in addition to 
renewable sources of electricity – such as nuclear power or coal-fired power plants with 
carbon capture and storage – while still complying with the regulation. California was the 
first North American jurisdiction to adopt a similar regulation for fuels, what it called the 
Low Carbon Fuel Standard. 
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At the other end of the spectrum are non-compulsory or voluntary policies. While 
non-compulsory policies such as subsidies are known to increase purchases of 
otherwise unaffordable buildings and equipment, they require a high level of government 
expenditure (Axsen & Wolinetz, 2018; Jaccard et al., 2003; Morrow et al., 2010). 
Moreover, they can be taken advantage of by firms and households who intended to 
invest in these changes anyway, thereby undermining the effectiveness of the policy. 
This is referred to as free-ridership. Thus, policymakers intending to induce large 
reductions in GHG emissions must implement compulsory policies, although this does 
not exclude the use of non-compulsory policies as part of a policy package. 
2.1.1. Policy evaluation criteria 
Researchers and policymakers often turn to multiple evaluation criteria to assess 
policies. These criteria assess the economic efficiency, environmental effectiveness, 
administrative feasibility and likely political acceptability of policies to facilitate choosing 
among them and determining their design. 
My first criterion, economic efficiency, is the cost-effectiveness of the policy in 
reducing emissions. Unnecessarily high costs may undermine public support for 
emissions reduction policies, and, more importantly, unnecessarily absorb societal 
resources that could be allocated to health, education and other welfare programs. 
Economists have long advocated for climate policies that satisfy the equi-marginal 
principle, which states that policies must achieve the same marginal emissions 
abatement cost across all sectors to minimize the total cost of emissions reductions. In 
practice, this principle dictates that emissions reductions policies should allow actors to 
choose all options available to them when they are required to restrict their GHG 
emissions (Baumol & Oates, 1971). Carbon pricing systems, such as a carbon tax or 
cap-and-trade program, can satisfy this requirement if they apply a single carbon price 
across the economy. Command-and-control regulations are generally considered 
economically inefficient, as they typically require adoption of a specific technology even 
though this technology might not be the lowest-cost option for GHG abatement for all 
firms and actors. Subsidies may also be economically inefficient if they induce GHG 
reduction investments that would not have occurred under a single economy-wide 
carbon price because of their high cost (Jaccard & Bataille, 2002). 
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My second criterion is environmental effectiveness. This is the ability of a policy 
to achieve the intended emissions reductions. Compulsory policies can be 
environmentally effective if designed properly. In an ex ante simulation study, Rhodes 
and Jaccard (2013) estimated that the Clean Electricity Standard would decrease B.C.’s 
GHG emissions by 12-17Mt CO2e by 2020 relative to a scenario without the policy. In an 
ex post econometric study, Murray and Rivers (2015) estimated that the carbon tax had 
reduced B.C.’s GHG emissions by 5-15% between its 2008 implementation and 2014. At 
higher levels, the carbon tax could cause large shifts in low-emission technology uptake 
and decrease emissions substantially as a result. Aside from carbon pricing, regulations 
have historically been the policy instrument of choice when governments have aimed to 
improve the environment (Huffman, 1994). Many climate policies satisfy this criterion to 
some degree. 
My third criterion is administrative feasibility. Certain policies will be simpler than 
others to implement. A carbon pricing system, for example, is simple because energy 
consumption is already taxed, so the carbon tax only changes the tax rate of taxes for 
which a collection system already exists. A cap-and-trade system, on the other hand, 
requires policymakers to allocate permits to firms, establish a permit trading market, and 
monitor firm reporting. Flexible regulations like the Low Carbon Fuel Standard have 
credit trading systems that require government resources to set up and maintain.  
My fourth criterion is political acceptability. Policies that receive less opposition 
from important segments of the public are more likely to be implemented. Policymakers 
aim to create policies that minimize political risk to maximize their chances of being re-
elected. Political acceptability of climate policies depends in part on the perceptions of 
influential individuals or groups. Notably, policy researchers have found that policy can 
be influenced by small groups of strongly opinionated constituents who wield influence 
or who will experience large real or perceived costs (Galbraith, 1952). Researchers have 
further theorized that self-serving biases makes such parties sensitive to salient, highly 
visible policies that they perceive as disadvantageous to themselves. Less salient 
policies do not tend to garner the same level of opposition (Chetty et al., 2009). 
Furthermore, a review conducted by Klenert et al. (2018) found that high trust in 
government has been correlated with successful implementation of the more visible 
policies set at higher stringencies. They note that public trust in government in North 
America is relatively low compared to trust in countries known to be climate leaders, 
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such as Finland, Denmark, Norway, and Sweden. This suggests an additional challenge 
in North America in terms of needing to minimize opposition by any potentially powerful 
interest group or group of voters. 
Carbon pricing has been especially challenging for policymakers. In 2008, the 
Liberal government of B.C. introduced a broad-based carbon tax, covering 
approximately 70% of the economy. The Liberal government is considered centre-right 
and implemented the carbon tax due to its theoretical economic efficiency. Although the 
government reduced corporate and personal income taxes simultaneously to keep the 
policy revenue-neutral, the visible impacts of the carbon tax were exploited by 
opponents of the government and opponents of effective climate policy. B.C.’s New 
Democratic Party (NDP) actively campaigned against the carbon tax between its 
inception in 2008 and the provincial election of 2009. While a global economic recession 
may have distracted opponents of the carbon tax and allowed it to survive the election 
cycle (Jaccard, 2012), the subsequent Liberal government froze the carbon tax at 
$30/tonne CO2e until 2018. Carbon pricing was also a key election issue in the 2019 
federal election; the Conservative Party of Canada emphasized the visible increases in 
gasoline prices at the pump and framed the policy as an attack on the middle class, just 
as it had successfully done in the 2008 federal election. 
Regulations for GHG emissions reduction may encounter less opposition. 
Rhodes, Axsen, and Jaccard (2017) determined that strong opposition among 
respondents in B.C. was much higher for the carbon tax than for the other four main 
compulsory climate policies, all of which were regulations (the Clean Electricity 
Standard, the Low Carbon Fuel Standard, tighter energy efficiency standards, and the 
carbon-neutral government mandate). 24% of respondents strongly opposed the carbon 
pricing policy, while less than 3-9% strongly opposed the other compulsory climate 
policies. Given that such regulations can satisfy the other three criteria if designed 
properly, researchers may help policymakers through evaluating the use of alternative 
policy packages that focus on either carbon pricing or flexible regulations.  
2.2. Climate policy in British Columbia 
British Columbia has had some form of climate policies in place since 1989. As in 
many other countries, the government’s earliest policy packages relied on relatively 
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ineffective information and subsidy programs. Between 2007-08, the B.C. government 
shifted its strategy and implemented its Climate Action Plan that introduced several 
compulsory policies. The current policy package, introduced in December 2018, added 
additional compulsory policies to the mix. In the following section, I briefly describe the 
climate policies currently in place and discuss their performance against the four policy 
evaluation criteria. 
Compulsory policies 
The current policy package makes use of a carbon tax as well as some 
regulations and voluntary policies. In 2018, the government lifted the freeze on the 
carbon tax that had been in place since 2012. As mentioned in the introduction, 
revenues from this tax were made neutral to the government’s budget with the 
introduction of offsetting income tax reductions. The carbon tax is slated to rise to 
$50/tonne CO2e by 2021, in line with the expectations of the Pan Canadian Framework, 
negotiated in 2016 between the federal and provincial governments. Industrial revenue 
collected by carbon taxes above the $30/tonne CO2e level will be channeled into two 
different incentive programs, titled the Industrial Incentive and the Clean Industry Fund. 
The industrial incentive reduces carbon taxes for facilities meeting specified carbon 
intensity benchmarks, while the Clean Industry Fund provides funding for specific 
industry emissions reductions projects, for which industries must apply. The current 
policy package does not raise the carbon tax to the level estimated by most experts to 
cause large emissions reductions (Carbon Pricing Leadership Coalition, 2017; World 
Bank Group, 2019). The carbon tax does not apply to emissions from planes and ships 
that are traveling to and from B.C., nor from forestry, waste, agriculture, and process 
emissions (released from the raw materials during processing) from industry. 
While the carbon tax applies to fossil fuels, transportation remains one of the 
largest sources of emissions in B.C. To further decarbonize this sector, the government 
implemented the Low Carbon Fuel Standard (LCFS) in 2010. The LCFS mandates a 
10% decrease in liquid fuel emission intensity by 2020. The government has announced 
its intention to raise the LCFS stringency to a 20% reduction of transportation carbon 
intensity by 2030. Petroleum product suppliers generally comply with the LCFS by 
blending biofuels into gasoline and diesel. However, as a flexible regulation, the LCFS 
allows suppliers to trade credits amongst themselves. Firms that find emission intensity 
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reductions to be cheaper than the credit price may over-comply and sell their surplus 
credits to firms that under-comply. To further increase flexibility, the LCFS also allows for 
the creation of Part 3 Agreements, which grants credits to projects that might facilitate 
the decarbonization of transportation, but don’t directly cause creditable reductions. The 
credits granted to Part 3 Agreement holders and suppliers who over-comply have the 
effect of subsidizing low-carbon fuels, reducing the economic efficiency of the policy 
(Holland et al., 2009). However, the LCFS has seen relatively little opposition, likely due 
to its low visibility (Rhodes et al., 2017). Alongside the LCFS, B.C. has a Renewable 
Fuel Standard (RFS) in place, which requires a minimum renewable fuel content in 
gasoline and diesel. Given that the policy mandates a specific type of decarbonization 
mechanism (biofuels), in a specific quantity, it is considerably less flexible than the 
LCFS. 
To specifically target the technological evolution of personal vehicles, the 
government introduced the Zero-Emission Vehicle (ZEV) mandate in 2018. It specifies 
that a minimum percentage of new vehicles sold in B.C. must be classified as zero-
emissions. Vehicles that can run at least part-time without producing any emissions, 
such as plug-in hybrid vehicles, qualify as partial ZEVs under this policy. The policy 
requires ZEVs to achieve 10% of vehicle sales by 2025, 30% by 2030, and 100% by 
2040. The policy was introduced in May 2019, and regulations are likely to be finalized 
by the end of 2020. 
There are additional transportation policies at the federal level. There are vehicle 
emissions standards for passenger vehicles, light trucks, and heavy-duty vehicles. The 
federal Passenger Automobile and Light Truck Greenhouse Gas Emissions Regulations 
specify fuel economies for new vehicles. Until very recently, this regulation was aligned 
with the corporate average fuel economy (CAFE) standards in the United States. For 
heavy-duty freight vehicles there are the Heavy-duty Vehicle and Engine Greenhouse 
Gas Emission Regulations, which mandate a declining emission intensity per short-ton 
mile. 
In many jurisdictions, electricity generation contributes substantial emissions 
alongside transportation. As mentioned previously, B.C.’s most significant policy from an 
emissions-reductions perspective is the Clean Electricity Standard. Much of the existing 
electricity generation (90%) in B.C. before 2007 was from large hydropower facilities. 
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Many proposed large hydropower projects have since become politically unacceptable 
due to their local social and environmental impacts (Jaccard, 2012; Trussart et al., 
2002). To prevent B.C.’s electricity system from shifting to cheaper fossil fuel generation, 
the Clean Electricity Standard requires that 93% of new electricity generation be from 
zero-emission sources. Once the government implemented the Clean Electricity 
Standard, BC Hydro was forced to abandon two contracts for coal-fired power plants and 
its own plan to build a natural gas-fired plant. Not only did the regulation result in 
immediate avoided emissions, but it prevented the province from developing an 
increasing dependency on fossil fuels (Jaccard, 2012).  
In 2018, the government committed to expanding high-voltage transmission lines 
into natural gas producing areas in northeastern British Columbia, the goal being to 
encourage natural gas producers to switch from natural gas to electricity in production 
processes and pumping. This is expected to reduce the life cycle emissions of 
extracting, processing, transporting, liquifying and consuming natural gas. The 
government stated that investments will be made to incentivize this fuel switch, although 
no monetary amounts have to date been specified. To further decrease natural gas 
production emissions, the government requires that methane emissions from natural gas 
production are to be reduced by 45% by 2025. This regulation does not specify a 
compliance pathway, which allows producers to choose the method best suited to their 
circumstances (although this is typically achieved by improving leak detection and 
pipeline repair programs). 
To reduce within-province natural gas combustion emissions, the government in 
2018 mandated a minimum biomethane content in the natural gas supply. For the 
remainder of this study, I refer to this policy as the Renewable Natural Gas (RNG) 
mandate. This policy requires a 15% minimum biomethane content in the natural gas 
stream supplied to the residential, commercial, and industrial sectors by 2030. Unlike 
natural gas, biomethane has very low life cycle emissions because its feedstock is 
derived from organic matter (Argonne National Laboratory, 2011). Biomethane is 
substantially more expensive to produce than natural gas (Electrigaz, 2008; International 
Energy Agency, 2020), and consequently will increase the price of the final blended 
natural gas product. Many natural gas-powered technologies have electric alternatives 
that can be used if natural gas prices increase too drastically. As an example, residential 
consumers can switch to electric heat pumps if natural gas costs become too high. 
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While a stringent RNG mandate would incentivize consumers to switch fuels, the 
provincial government is also working towards decarbonizing buildings through 
increasing the energy and emissions stringency of the building code for the construction 
of new buildings. It released the BC Energy Step Code in 2017. The code sets out 
several energy efficiency and emission levels, or “steps,” that municipalities can require 
or incentivize in place of the BC Building Code. Currently, only the lower levels of the 
steps can be required by municipalities. The provincial government claims that in 2032 
the higher steps (3, 4, and 5) of the BC Energy Step Code will be in force, although a 
government in 2017 has no control over the policies of a government 15 years in the 
future. 
Non-compulsory policies 
To encourage further uptake of ZEVs, the government made ZEV subsidies 
available for consumers wishing to purchase a new vehicle. There are additional 
subsidies for those who trade in an existing internal combustion engine (ICE) vehicle. 
These subsidies, when combined with the federal ZEV subsidy introduced in 2019, 
results in subsidies of up to $8,000 for vehicles under $45,000. A limited amount of 
funds are set aside each year to fund these subsidies on a first-come-first-served basis. 
To motivate fuel switching from natural gas to electricity, the government is also offering 
a similar $2,000 subsidy for residential heat pumps. 
The provincial government committed to several different actions designed to 
decarbonize smaller segments of the economy. These actions include support for off-
grid communities, the development of vocational programs, and the electrification of 
government facilities. Many of these policies fall under the “voluntary” category, as they 
do not require any party (including the government) to make the changes. 
2.3. Types of energy-economy models 
I use an energy-economy model to simulate the environmental and economic 
impacts of the climate policies described above. In this section, I provide some 
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background into the features of energy-economy models to contextualize my choice of 
model2. 
Energy-economy models, broadly speaking, are mathematical representations of 
an economy that can be used as tools to examine the environmental and economic 
impact of climate policies. Models can be designed to provide a variety of information. 
To meet my research objectives, I specifically required a simulation model. Simulation 
models create projections based on trends from historical data and research that reveal 
the current and likely future preferences of firms and households under changing 
incentives. The researcher can change these projections by simulating incentive-
changing policies in the model. Generally, models can be differentiated by their 
performance along the following attributes:  
1. Technological explicitness: the degree to which technology is represented in 
detail. This includes the technology’s cost and its physical potential (energy use, 
service output). Ideally, the model should be able to represent how costs decline 
as the production and diffusion of a new technology increases. 
2. Behavioral realism: representation of the key factors affecting technology and 
energy choices made by firms and households. 
3. Macro-economic feedbacks: the model’s ability to reflect how changes in 
production costs and technology choices will change the structure of the 
economy, total output, government revenues, government expenditures, trade, 
investment, jobs, and monetary value. 
Models with a high degree of technological explicitness have historically been 
referred to as “bottom-up”. These represent a broad set of technologies in detail and 
model how these technologies compete to meet service demands. Building a model to 
track technology stocks allows the modeler to see changes in technology choices over 
time as compulsory policies influence financial costs and other factors. This can be very 
useful to policymakers who seek to influence technology choices to reduce emissions. 
However, most conventional bottom-up models lack behavioral realism. Older bottom-up 
 
2 For an in-depth overview of the history, attributes, and applications of energy-economy models, 
see Jaccard (2009). 
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models treat competing technologies as perfect substitutes even though the non-
financial preferences of firms and households can play a huge role in technology uptake. 
For example, a bicycle is a much cheaper mode of transportation than a personal 
vehicle. However, cyclists experience some degree of discomfort relative to a car in the 
form of exertion, occasional poor weather, increased safety risks, and a lengthier travel 
time. These are factors that are not included in the financial cost of a bicycle but will be 
considered by the purchaser. Modelers refer to such welfare costs as “intangible costs.”  
Many early bottom-up models also lacked macro-economic feedbacks and thus were 
unable to estimate the change in output that would result from climate policies. However, 
as I discuss later in this section, complete equilibrium macro-economic feedbacks are 
not always necessary for modeling the key effects of climate and energy policies. 
As described by Jaccard (2009), models that estimate the aggregate 
relationships between the relative costs and market shares of inputs to the economy and 
its outputs are referred to as top-down models. Because top-down models estimate 
these relationships from real-world market data, they are thought to incorporate a high 
degree of behavioral realism – economists refer to these as revealed preferences. Top-
down models make use of elasticity of substitution parameters to represent substitution 
between competing inputs in the economy. Elasticity of substitution parameters dictate 
the ease with which a climate policy can induce a shift from high-emission inputs to low-
emission inputs (Ramskov & Munksgaard, 2001). It is not always possible to obtain 
adequate historical records to estimate statistically significant parameters. Where 
elasticity of substitution parameters cannot be estimated, the modeler makes judgement 
calls on the appropriate value, which introduces the risk of inaccuracy and bias. An 
additional weakness of typical top-down models is that their parameters represent 
responses with past technologies to cost changing policies whereas emerging 
technologies may trigger significantly different responses. For example, the response to 
a carbon tax that increases gasoline prices may be greater once electric vehicles are a 
more viable alternative. Likewise, it can be difficult to simulate policies that target a 
specific new technology, such as a purchase subsidy for electric or hydrogen fuel cell 
vehicles. 
Models can be further categorized as partial or full equilibrium. This characteristic 
describes the degree to which the model represents all the feedback effects in the 
economy. A partial equilibrium model will represent sections of the economy, finding an 
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equilibrium amongst these represented sections. To increase realism, the model may 
also equilibrate with the economy “outside” what is represented in the model. Partial 
equilibrium models are generally less computationally taxing to run, as they will not need 
to equilibrate a full economy nor any external economies outside of the one the 
researcher chooses to represent. Because they are less complex, it is easier for 
researchers and policymakers to understand the model’s results (Pfenninger, 2017; 
Pindyck, 2018). Unfortunately, their incomplete representation of economic impacts 
means that important policy implications may be underrepresented. Modelers can help 
policymakers decide if these implications are significant and potentially adjust their 
results to compensate for the lack of general equilibrium feedbacks in the model. 
Full (or general) equilibrium models must equate the inputs and outputs of an 
entire economy (the boundary of which is still defined by the modeler). Full equilibrium 
models begin under an assumed equilibrium, which is then disrupted by climate policies. 
The model calculates a new set of prices based on elasticity of substitution parameters 
and finds a new level of consumption and production based on supply and demand 
functions (Bergman and Henrekson, 2003). Full equilibrium models that link 
macroeconomic feedbacks are referred to as Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) 
models. Policymakers may find it convenient to rely on full-equilibrium models given that 
they can be used to estimate changes in GDP, employment, and trade with external 
economies. These estimates are useful for assessing the fullest possible economic 
impacts of high-stringency policies seeking to almost completely decarbonize the 
energy-economy system. 
Depending on what the researcher chooses to analyse, both partial and full 
equilibrium models can be useful. GTech, the model used by Navius Research for their 
2018 government-commissioned evaluation of CleanBC, is a model built on 
macroeconomic relationships that also incorporates a high degree of technological 
explicitness. Classic “bottom-up” models such as MARKAL have been expanded into 
families of models that integrate technological explicitness and macroeconomic 
feedbacks to increase their utility (Loulou et al., 2004). A variety of energy-economy 
models are used to advise all levels of government, from spatial and technology-focused 
models at the municipal level to large-scale economy-climate models at the international 
level that require teams of researchers to maintain.  The model I use for this study, 
CIMS, has been applied in Canada and other countries since the early 1990s, modified 
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to suit investigations at the urban, regional, and national levels and to incorporate new 
evidence and techniques over the last two decades. I discuss CIMS in more detail in the 
methodology section. 
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Chapter 3. Modeling Methodology 
CIMS is a partial-equilibrium energy-economy simulation model that includes 
technological explicitness, behavioral realism, and, to some extent, macroeconomic 
feedbacks. CIMS tracks the technology capital stocks as they age and are replaced over 
time. It has a long record of being used for provincial and national-level analysis 
(Jaccard et al., 2003). In section 3.1., I give an overview of CIMS’s structure and the 
market-share equation. In section 3.2, I discuss the specific settings I used for this study. 
In section 3.3., I review the modeling assumptions I use that apply to all policy runs. 
Finally, in section 3.4, I briefly address CIMS’s limitations. 
3.1. CIMS model overview 
CIMS simulates the economy in 5-year intervals from the year 2000 through to 
2050. In each time interval, the model runs through the following steps (Bataille, 2005; 
Rudd, 2012): 
1. Demand assessment: The model assesses demand based on the forecasts 
provided by the user. Demand is represented by a unit of service provided, 
such as vehicle kilometers traveled, or unit of floorspace lit. 
2. Retirement and retrofit: During each time period, some of the previous year’s 
capital stock is retired. The service provided by the remaining stock is 
subtracted from the forecasted energy service demand. The difference 
between total demand and the available stock determines how much new 
stock should be purchased. 
3. Competition for new stock: Technologies compete to fulfill the new stock 
requirements. The competition between these technologies is represented by 
the market share equation (Figure 1 CIMS market-share equation (Bataille et 
al., 2007), which I explain below. 
4. Equilibrium of supply and demand: Once there is adequate stock to fulfill 
forecasted demand, the model iterates between energy supply and demand 
until it reaches an equilibrium set of energy prices and energy demand. 
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5. Output: The model uses its technology market shares to determine energy 
consumption, emissions, economic factor costs, and service output. 
Competition for new market shares in CIMS is represented by the market share 
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Figure 1 CIMS market-share equation (Bataille et al., 2007) 
This equation calculates market share for a technology by dividing the 
annualized costs of the technology (j) by the sum of the annualized costs of all other 
competing technologies (k) in a logistic function that includes all real and intangible costs 
that would be associated with purchasing and operating the technology. This includes 
the capital cost (CC), which is multiplied by the capital recovery factor to determine 
annualized capital cost, operation and maintenance costs (MC), and energy costs (EC).  
The CIMS market share equation contains three behavioral parameters that 
distinguish it from traditional bottom-up technology-rich simulation models:  
• r represents the revealed time preference (private discount rate) of the 
household or firm choosing between technologies. This value can vary 
across sectors because of the different decision-makers being simulated.  
• i represents intangible costs, which are additional costs not reflected in 
the purchase price of technologies. These reflect non-financial factors in 
firm and household preferences when choosing between technologies.  
• The heterogeneity parameter, v, indicates the circumstances different 
consumers face when making what is otherwise the same purchase 
decision. If the market were homogeneous, the apparent least-cost 
technology would always capture all the market. In reality, people and 
firms face heterogeneous costs and have different perceptions of costs 
and risks and are therefore likely to make different decisions based on 
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their circumstances. A high v value causes the least-cost technology to 
receive most, if not all, of the market share, indicating that most 
technology acquirers are similar in a particular case. A low v value causes 
a greater diversity of technological adoption, indicating a greater 
heterogeneity of market conditions and consumer perceptions, even if the 
single least-cost choice appears obvious to the analyst (Bataille, 2007). 
By modeling all the available technologies involved in an economy’s production 
and consumption of energy, CIMS can track the flow of energy in the economy and how 
it evolves as firms and households are influenced by compulsory policies. Policies can 
provide certain technologies with cost advantages over others or even specify minimum 
or maximum market shares so that the model outcomes match regulatory requirements. 
B.C.’s Zero-Emission Vehicle (ZEV) mandate, for example, requires a minimum new 
market share of zero-emission vehicles, which can be set explicitly in CIMS. As CIMS 
can simulate competitions between technologies for nearly every aspect of the economy, 
it is a suitable model for energy and climate policy analysis. 
Aside from its market-share equation, CIMS incorporates a suite of other 
functions designed to characterize microeconomic effects and behavioral realism. The 
Declining Capital Cost (DCC) function characterizes the rate at which capital costs fall as 
a result of learning-by-doing and economies-of-scale with greater adoption of new and 
emerging technologies. This function allows the capital costs of technologies to fall as a 
function of cumulative adoption of the technology in the model. Capital cost is also 
impacted by an exogenous rate of decline if there is a rising global production of the new 
technology. The declining intangible cost function captures how the perceived risk of a 
new technology falls as its market share increases, also known as the “neighbour effect” 
(Jaccard, 2009). Together, these functions represent both the economic and the 
behavioral effects that can reduce the real and perceived costs of technologies in the 
market. 
CIMS includes functions that represent some macroeconomic feedbacks such as 
changes in disposable income, reductions in service demands (like mobility) with rising 
costs, and Armington elasticities that reflect reductions in industrial output (of emission-
intensive, trade-exposed industries) with rising costs relative to competitors (Bataille, 
2007). Industrial output in CIMS is initially set exogenously and thus does not change 
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unless the user chooses to activate Armington elasticities as an optional macroeconomic 
feedback function3. 
3.2. CIMS settings and sector calibration 
3.2.1. Model settings 
CIMS includes several settings that the analyst can adjust to suit their research. 
These settings dictate which variables will be calculated endogenously and which must 
be set exogenously. The scope of the modeling exercise may dictate which variables are 
endogenous or exogenous. Research at the urban level, for example, can be conducted 
with a minimal level of endogenous calculation, as an urban economy will be largely 
influenced by provincial, national, and global markets. A national-level analysis may 
have more influence on energy prices and technology economies-of-scale. Even at a 
national level, the user might choose to model certain parameters exogenously, if the 
country is considered a price-taker in global markets. Thus, CIMS is very flexible for 
modeling runs at many regional scales. I summarize my economy-wide settings in Table 
1.  
 
3 For the purposes of this study, I assume that the rest of the world works towards similarly stringent 
climate policies, which would cause imported goods to rise in cost at the approximately the same 
rate as domestic goods. I explain this assumption further in Chapter 4. 
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Table 1 CIMS settings for this study. 
CIMS Setting Setting for this study 
Energy supply and demand On 
Fuel production 
Crude Oil Exogenous 
Natural gas Exogenous 
Coal Exogenous 
Refined petroleum products Exogenous 
Fuel Pricing  
Crude oil Exogenous 
Natural gas Endogenous 
Refined petroleum products Exogenous 
Electricity Endogenous 
Biofuels Endogenous 
Macro feedbacks Off 
Energy trade Off 
GHG pre-cognition Average (begins in 2020) 
Revenue recycling On 
For my research, I set energy supply and demand to equilibrate.  I also specify 
which energy supplies would follow a fixed exogenous production and price trajectory 
versus a trajectory calculated endogenously to meet demand within the model. As B.C. 
is a price taker in the context of global markets, most energy price trajectories can be set 
as exogenous to the model. In this study, I allow crude oil, coal, and refined petroleum 
products to follow exogenous production and price forecasts, which were obtained from 
the Canadian Energy Regulator’s (CER) Energy Futures Report 20164. I rely on the 
2016 report rather than more recent reports due its High and Low LNG scenarios, which 
are relevant to the LNG scenario analysis I conduct for this study. To stay consistent, I 
use the 2016 report for conventional fuel prices as well. 
B.C.’s electricity market is mostly self-contained, relying on hydropower with 
minimal imports from Alberta and exports to the United States. Therefore, I set electricity 
production as endogenous. Although B.C. is currently a price taker in the global natural 
 
4 As of 2019, the National Energy Board has been replaced by the Canadian Energy Regulator. 
Therefore, I credit all work I reference by the National Energy Board to the CER. 
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gas market, the government’s RNG mandate is set to push B.C.’s domestic natural gas 
consumption towards biomethane. In anticipation of a shift in B.C.’s consumption and 
production of natural gas, I set domestic natural gas pricing as endogenous. I set the 
level of natural gas production in B.C. exogenously, dependent as it is on the gas trading 
prices resulting from the interaction of global demand and supply through pipeline and 
LNG trading. 
For larger-scale studies, researchers using CIMS can make use of the 
aforementioned Armington elasticities, which alter domestic production based on relative 
production cost changes. While these elasticities can be useful for approximating 
national-level interactions with global markets, I chose to turn them off for this study. As 
discussed previously, a jurisdiction as small as B.C. is unlikely to pursue stringent 
climate policies independently of other jurisdictions.  
CIMS has a “GHG-precognition” feature, which allows the researcher to set 
consumer anticipation of an emissions pricing policy. The government could announce a 
base level for a pricing scheme and specify its increasing stringency over time. This was 
the case for the government of B.C. with its scheduled rising carbon tax over the period 
2008 to 2012, and more recently the federal government, with its carbon price on a 
scheduled increase between 2018 and 2022. Transparency in pricing allows firms and 
households to respond to the change in price when it is convenient. For example, a firm 
with technology stock that needs to be retired could switch to a less emissions-intensive, 
but more expensive technology if it knew that a future increase in the carbon price would 
result in the life-cycle costs of the high-emissions alternative exceeding that of the low-
emissions technology. In CIMS, GHG-precognition can be set one of three ways: 
“current,” which only accounts for the emissions prices during the iteration period, 
“average,” which accounts for the tax over the lifetime of the technology, and “discount,” 
which accounts for the tax over the lifetime of the technology using discounted future 
emission charges. I set GHG-precognition to average, in line with similar studies 
previously conducted with CIMS. Firms and households will be able to anticipate future 
changes in emissions prices but are unlikely to conduct a formal economic calculation 
that discounts future increases in emissions prices back to present values. 
CIMS can include the return of revenue from emissions prices directly back to the 
sector where it was collected. Until 2018, this option was reflective of B.C.’s carbon 
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pricing policy. B.C. collected tax revenue from carbon pricing, but reduced corporate and 
personal income taxes by an approximately equal amount (Murray & Rivers, 2015). With 
the introduction of the current policy package, the provincial government announced that 
it would earmark revenue from industrial carbon pricing over $30/tonne CO2e into 
several industrial decarbonization incentives. Given that all revenues collected for these 
incentives will eventually be reinvested back into the industrial sectors, I continue to 
assume full revenue recycling for industry and all other sectors. 
3.2.2. Calibration of the model to historical emissions 
All models, to some extent, are calibrated to past data on the energy-economy 
system to ensure that the model adequately represents the static condition of that 
system in the current period and to also, hopefully, capture dynamics of that system. For 
this study, I calibrate my representation of B.C. in CIMS to the federal government’s 
National Inventory Report (NIR). The NIR comprises data collected from industry, 
modeled estimates, as well as an array of emissions and other data. At the time of 
calibration, the most recent report was from 2018. I calibrate to historical emissions for 
the 2005, 2010, and 2015 timesteps. 
To calibrate the emissions by sector, I adjust the exogenous demand forecasts. 
These forecasts specify the service demands for each sector that the model must use 
technology stocks to meet. I adjust demand forecasts over other parameters because 
increasing demand preserves the relationship between represented technologies and 
their associated fuel use, process emissions (such as those released in concrete 
production), and combustion emissions. Given that the policies I model, such as the 
carbon tax, impact technology uptake according to associated fuel use and emissions, I 
concluded that changing demand forecasting is the least disruptive way of calibrating 
CIMS. I adjust the forecast for each sector until emissions in CIMS were within a 10% 
threshold of the equivalent NIR sector (Table 2). I focus on the industrial sectors, as the 
demand forecasting for the residential, commercial, electricity, and transportation sectors 
are based on exogenous projections from other researchers. 
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Table 2 Calculated differences between CIMS output emissions and NIR emissions. Emissions are shown in 
MtCO2e.  
2005 2010 2015 
Sector CIMS NIR Diff CIMS NIR Diff CIMS NIR Diff 
Chemical Products 0.97 0.89 -9.2% 0.43 0.44 2.4% 0.38 0.35 -7.3% 
Industrial Minerals 2.51 2.33 -7.8% 1.77 1.67 -6.2% 2.23 2.22 -0.3% 
Metal Smelting 1.60 1.73 7.6% 1.28 1.43 10.4% 0.92 0.93 1.2% 
Mineral Mining 0.29 0.30 2.0% 0.25 0.23 -6.6% 0.31 0.32 3.4% 
Paper 
Manufacturing 
1.71 1.85 7.3% 2.11 1.95 -8.3% 1.83 1.87 1.9% 
Other 
Manufacturing 
4.31 4.28 -0.9% 2.51 2.26 -10.9% 2.48 2.35 -5.5% 
Agriculture 3.09 3.07 -0.5% 2.39 2.66 10.1% 3.03 2.86 -6.0% 
Waste 4.22 4.15 -1.6% 4.10 4.02 -2.1% 3.71 3.69 -0.6% 
Oil & Gas 12.08 12.50 3.3% 13.62 13.43 -1.4% 14.32 13.84 -3.5% 
Coal Mining 1.56 1.70 8.0% 1.92 1.88 -2.6% 1.46 1.63 10.2% 
 
The NIR sectors do not equate exactly with the sectors in CIMS. The differences 
in categorization mean that some discrepancies occur between sectoral emissions in the 
NIR and CIMS.  
3.2.3. Sector activity levels, energy production, and energy price 
projections 
To set exogenous demand forecasts for industrial production and non-industrial 
energy service demands after 2015, I rely on historical production data from Statistics 
Canada and used various sources for setting growth rates out to 2050. The annual 
growth rate for each sector is listed in Table 3. For natural gas forecasting, I use 
forecasts from the CER’s Energy Futures report. To determine growth in demand, I 
average the percentage change in GDP over 5-year intervals from the earliest available 
year (either 1997 or 1990) in each sector until the latest available year, 2018. If there are 
any unusual spikes in GDP, I judge on a case-by-case basis on whether to include them. 
I then apply this average percentage change to the demand forecast extending to 2050. 
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Table 3 Annual change in activity in CIMS, by sector 
Sector Annual Growth Rate 
Residential 1.0% 
Commercial 1.8% 
Transportation Personal 1.4% 
Transportation Freight 0.8% 
Chemical Products 1.3% 
Industrial Minerals 1.5% 
Metal Smelting 1.4% 
Mineral Mining 0.5% 
Paper Manufacturing -0.6% 




Petroleum Refining 2.4% 
Petroleum Crude Extraction 2.5% 
Natural Gas Extraction 0.7% Low, 1.8% High 
Coal Mining -0.4% 
I do not make changes to the demand forecasts of other sectors.  The personal 
and freight transportation sectors were calibrated by previous researchers in the Energy 
and Materials Research Group (EMRG) to match modeled data from Natural Resources 
Canada’s Comprehensive Energy Use Database. Past EMRG researchers also 
compiled population projection data for the province, as well as commercial floorspace 
projection data. These drive demand for the residential and commercial sectors. Since 
the projections for these sectors match the NIR’s emissions projections relatively closely, 
I do not alter them. 
3.2.4. LNG production uncertainty 
The natural gas production forecast was set separately from the other sectors. I 
focus on natural gas production due to uncertainty surrounding LNG development 
projects. Increased natural gas exports will cause significant increases in industrial 
energy demand and could cause a substantial increase in industrial GHG emissions, 
depending on the type of energy used to liquify the gas for export by tanker. To 
characterize the changes to provincial emissions this uncertainty would cause, I 
duplicate the policy runs under two scenarios: High LNG and Low LNG. This allows me 
to examine changes to capital stocks and fuel use that will occur under different energy 
demands from the natural gas extraction sector. To set the exogenous production 
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forecasts for these scenarios, I use the CER’s 2016 Energy Futures Report, which 
specifically explores High LNG and Low LNG scenarios. The Energy Futures Report 
projects to 2040. I extend the 2040 projection to 2045 and 2050. I set the sector’s 
production rate and export rate to match the report. 
3.3. New CIMS sector assumptions 
Natural Gas Extraction 
For this study, I update the way biomethane is produced and used in the CIMS 
model from previous studies. The Renewable Natural Gas mandate requires that the 
natural gas supply contain a minimum of 15% biomethane content by 2030. This policy 
includes the residential, commercial, and industrial sectors. Previously, biomethane had 
only been available in CIMS as a fuel alternative for industrial boiler technologies. A 
separate version of CIMS scaled down to the urban level also simulated competition 
between natural gas and biomethane in the residential and commercial sectors. Both 
competitions were modeled by creating methane fuel service that contained biomethane 
and conventional natural gas production technologies. Biomethane pricing was set 
exogenously, with costs rising proportionally to the price changes of natural gas (also 
exogenous at the time). 
I alter these in-sector competitions slightly. On the demand side, I keep the 
competitions between biomethane and natural gas. On the supply side, I add 
biomethane production technologies to the natural gas supply sector. Adding 
representative biomethane technologies on the supply side and in end-use demand 
sectors allows me to model an increase in proportional biomethane supply as well as 
any potential fuel switching as a response to this shift. To determine the costs for these 
technologies, I rely on a 2008 report conducted by Electrigaz Consulting and a follow-up 
2017 report by Hallbar Consulting on biomethane production feasibility in B.C. Electrigaz 
and Hallbar calculated a conservative retail cost of approximately $28/GJ of biomethane 
produced. This is significantly higher than the cost of natural gas. I anticipate that the 
biomethane blending mandates will increase the cost of blended natural gas, which in 
the CIMS policy simulations should lead to a growing substitution of natural gas for 
electricity in building services and potentially other end-uses. Due to the anticipated 
decrease in domestic demand for blended natural gas that would result from this policy, I 
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assume that B.C. will be able to support enough domestic biomethane production to 
meet demand. Costs on the production side were calculated from the capital, 
operational, and energy costs estimated by Electrigaz.  
Personal Transportation 
To model B.C.’s personal vehicle policies more accurately, I altered the vehicle 
motor competition in CIMS. Normally, vehicle motors are modeled in a competition 
separate from the rest of the vehicle body. Vehicle body costs are assumed to be similar 
regardless of the motor that drives the vehicle. To force a minimum market share of 
zero-emissions vehicles for the ZEV mandate, I separated the competition of internal 
combustion engine (ICE) vehicles from the general vehicle motor competition. A variety 
of ICE vehicle motors now compete to fulfill a general demand for “ICE services,” the 
market share of which declines at a rate determined by the stringency of the ZEV policy. 
The general ICE technology that demands “ICE services” competes with a variety of 
ZEVs.  
Biofuel assumptions 
Suppliers have lowered the carbon intensity of gasoline and diesel by blending 
ethanol and biodiesel as required by renewable fuel mandates. The content of ethanol in 
gasoline and biodiesel in diesel has an upper limit known as the “blend wall.” Currently, 
the blend wall for conventional ethanol in gasoline is about 10% ethanol, while for 
conventional biodiesel the content is limited to 20% of the diesel blend. These maximum 
blends for biofuels will remain a limitation in transportation decarbonization until fully 
blendable fuels are commercialized and affordable. For this study I assume a blend wall 
of 10% ethanol in 2020, rising to 15% in 2030 as manufacturers develop the capacity to 
burn higher ethanol blends. The biodiesel blend wall in CIMS does not rise beyond 20%, 
but diesel can be substituted entirely by hydrogenation-derived renewable diesel 
(HDRD). HDRD is derived from the same feedstocks as conventional biodiesel, but 
undergoes more complex processing and is costlier as a result (Natural Resources 
Canada, 2012). I make HDRD available in the model to compete with the diesel blend in 
2015. However, I place limit on the proportion of HDRD that can enter the market in 
early years to prevent a sudden uptake that does not reflect short-term availability.  
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Biofuel consumption is also constrained by feedstock availability. Conventional 
ethanol is produced from corn, sugarcane, and wheat. Researchers have noted that the 
demand for food crops for biofuels may create competition for arable land and spur an 
increase in food prices (Fischer et al., 2010). This is detrimental to both food security 
and cost-effective biofuel production. To mitigate reliance on food crops, among other 
reasons, scientists developed advanced (also known as second-generation) biofuels to 
use non-food feedstocks, such as woody biomass and other cellulosic feedstocks 
(Evans, 2007; Robertson et al., 2008). Biomass used in the production of second-
generation biofuels can be grown on lower-quality land that is not used for food 
production (Gelfand et al., 2013). 
The Global Energy Assessment (2012) estimates that, by using a wide range of 
potential feedstocks, Canada can produce enough biomass to maintain a 1.7 EJ/year 
production capacity by 2050, without encroaching on prime agricultural land. Given that 
B.C. currently consumes approximately 0.45EJ of RPP annually, I assume there will be 
adequate biofuel production within B.C. to meet the demand simulated by my application 
of CIMS to the year 2050. In its most recent climate plan, the provincial government 
discussed establishing a renewable fuel industry, increasing domestic production to 
supply 8% of B.C.’s road transportation fuel needs by 2030. I assume that this industry 
will able to grow sufficiently to meet domestic demand for biofuels. If provincial 
production does not grow adequately, I assume that B.C. will also be able to import fuel 
or biomass. 
Biomethane assumptions 
As with biofuels, I assume that there is adequate feedstock in B.C. to meet 
biomethane demand. Recent technological innovations have made it feasible to create 
biomethane out of woody biomass, further extending the feasible production quantity 
within B.C. Currently, most of the wood residue produced in B.C. is left onsite or burned 
as a waste product (Hoberg et al., 2016). Aside from biomethane, woody biomass has 
been targeted by biofuel production companies, researchers, and consultants as a 
potential feedstock for other biofuels as well. While there is potential for competition for 
woody biomass as a feedstock, a fall in domestic demand for natural gas may render 
this concern as moot. Although it is theoretically possible to produce enough biomethane 
to meet demand in end-use sectors, its cost is likely to fluctuate according to demand 
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and feedstock availability. To accommodate this likelihood, I set the pricing for 
biomethane conservatively high. 
In this study, I assume that biomethane production is the dominant pathway 
towards decarbonizing the natural gas blend, but this is not necessarily the case. Further 
innovations in hydrogen production may allow it to become a viable alternative to natural 
gas. Using CCS may prove to be the more cost-effective option for low-emission natural 
gas production should biomethane feedstock prove limited. However, it is more 
important for these alternatives to be competitive with electricity; hydrogen and natural 
gas with CCS are not currently competitive with electricity for most energy end-uses. 
Unless the costs fall substantially, B.C.’s residential, commercial, and industrial sectors 
are more likely to electrify as depicted in this study.  
 
3.3.2. Limitations 
As noted, CIMS is a partial-equilibrium model with some of the corresponding 
limitations of such models. General equilibrium models incorporate a utility function for 
firms and households which simulates how they substitute between non-energy 
intermediate and final goods. To illustrate, wood and concrete can be used as 
substitutes in building construction to some degree. In reality, if the price of concrete 
were to rise high enough, firms would substitute more wood in buildings. Since CIMS 
does not represent this substitution potential between non-energy intermediate and final 
products, this lack could result in an overestimation of the costs of climate policies. As 
one sector’s production costs rise relative to another’s, a general equilibrium model can 
simulate how substitution might occur between products to lower the cost of responding 
to the climate policy, thus showing a lower cost of society achieving ambitious 
decarbonization targets. At the same time, however, governments design their climate 
policies to minimize structural change, by reducing for example the effect of climate 
policies on the production costs of different sectors. This suggests that a general 
equilibrium model may not always be necessary. 
My representation of B.C. in CIMS as a stand-alone economy is also a limitation. 
Modeling B.C. alone, without macroeconomic feedbacks, is likely to underrepresent the 
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adjustments in trade between B.C.’s economy and external economies. It could be more 
accurate to have other provinces and the United States, Canada’s largest trading 
partner, explicitly represented within the model. Previous national-level studies using 
CIMS have represented all of Canada’s provinces and territories. However, updating 
these provinces with the current and more stringent policies to match my target-
achieving packages was deemed outside the scope of this study.  
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Chapter 4. Run Descriptions and Assumptions 
To explore the changes in technological outcomes that result from different 
packages of decarbonization policies, I explore four different policy runs. In this section, I 
describe and list my assumptions for each run. BAU provides a reference point by 
depicting how emissions would increase without further increases in policy stringency. 
Current and Announced Policies (CAP) simulates the emissions trajectory with 
committed B.C. government policies as of 2020. CAP + Carbon Pricing models the 
current policy package along with a carbon price that rises sufficiently in a leading role to 
cause emissions to achieve the future targets. Finally, CAP + Flexible Regulations also 
models the current policy package but instead of a rising carbon price increases the 
stringencies of a set of flexible regulations sufficiently to achieve the climate targets. For 
details on how I modeled each policy in CIMS, see Appendix A. 
4.1. Business as Usual (BAU) 
This run represents B.C.’s climate policies as of 2020, with no additional 
increases in stringencies even if they have been announced to the public. BAU was 
used as a reference run for comparison with the other scenarios in this study. It could 
represent a scenario where a new government is elected and policies are either frozen 
at their current stringencies or repealed. Several Canadian political parties, such as the 
federal Conservative Party of Canada and the B.C. Liberals, have proposed such 
repeals as part of their election platforms. 
• B.C.’s provincial carbon tax was introduced in 2008, at $10/tonne CO2e. 
The price rose by $5/tonne of CO2e per year until 2012, when it was 
frozen at $30/tonne CO2e until 2018. The provincial carbon tax is 
scheduled to rise $5/tonne of CO2e per year until it reaches $50/tonne 
CO2e in 2021. At the national level, the federal government implemented 
a backstop carbon price that rises to $50/tonne CO2e in 2022. For the 
BAU run, I keep the tax at its scheduled 2020 stringency of $45/tonne 
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CO2e5. Prices are entered into CIMS in 2005 dollars; I assume an 
inflation rate of 1.5%. The carbon tax is not indexed to inflation. As a 
result, the carbon tax declines slowly in real terms after it is frozen. 
• I assume that the LCFS meets its target of a 10% carbon intensity 
reduction by 2020. I assume that the LCFS credit market clears in each of 
the model’s timesteps.  
• The Renewable Fuel Requirement requires a set proportion of renewable 
fuels per unit of fossil fuel. To model this policy in CIMS, I phase out 
unblended gasoline in 2010.  
• To encourage adoption of zero-emission vehicles, both the provincial and 
federal governments currently have EV subsidies in place. Each 
government sets aside a specific budget amount for these and it 
fluctuates from year to year. It is difficult to anticipate how current and 
successive governments will alter EV subsidies beyond the current levels. 
For example, in 2019, the B.C. EV subsidy was reduced from $5000 per 
EV to $3000, without a change in government. The pricing scheme may 
or may not change following the 2020 provincial election. Leading up to 
the most recent federal election, The Conservative Party of Canada did 
not include any wording on vehicle subsidies or rebates in their climate 
plan. For the purposes of this study, I assume that EV subsidies in B.C. 
cease after CIMS’s 2020 timestep. 
• As of 2020, 98% of B.C.’s electricity is generated from renewable 
resources. The Clean Electricity Act was introduced by the B.C. Liberals 
(B.C.’s centre-right political party) in 2011 and no government has made 
significant moves to repeal it since. For this reason, I assume that the 
policy remains in place under a BAU scenario, although it does not rise in 
stringency. 
 
5 The scheduled increase in the carbon tax from $40/tonne CO2e to $45/tonne CO2e has been 
delayed due to the Covid-19 pandemic. Its scheduled increase will resume in April 2021. I have 
kept the tax rising according to its original schedule, as the pause will have a minimal impact over 
a multi-decade simulation. 
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• Finally, I include the federal vehicle emissions standards that separate 
personal and light-duty vehicles from heavy-duty vehicles. To model this 
policy, I assume that standard ICE vehicles become unavailable in 2020 
and higher-efficiency ICE vehicles are sold instead. 
4.2. Current and Announced Policies (CAP) 
The CAP policy run is a representation of British Columbia’s current and 
announced climate policies as of December 2018. It is difficult to anticipate how the 
government will implement climate policy beyond 2030 and the efforts of one 
government are not always sustained with a change of government – examples being 
the climate policy stagnation in B.C. from 2010 to 2015 with the government of Premier 
Christy Clark and federally in Canada from 2006 to 2015 with the government of Prime 
Minister Stephen Harper. Therefore, I assume that all policies remain frozen at their 
2030 levels unless stated otherwise. CAP includes all policies from BAU, with the 
following changes: 
• The carbon tax rises as part of the new policy package, from its frozen 
2012 level of $30/tonne CO2e to $50/tonne CO2e by 2021. As there have 
been no announcements to increase the tax beyond this point, I hold the 
tax at $50/tonne CO2e from 2021 through until 2050. The current policy 
package changes the way revenue from the tax is distributed. All revenue 
from industries exceeding $30/tonne CO2e will be collected and 
redistributed through the Industrial Incentive and the Clean Industry Fund. 
To simplify this policy for modeling purposes, I assume that all revenue 
collected from industry is fully recycled back into its respective sectors. 
• As with the LCFS, the ZEV mandate uses a credit trading mechanism. 
Automakers who exceed the minimum share of zero-emission vehicle 
sales are granted credits that can be traded with automakers who incur 
debits. I assume that the ZEV market clears in each timestep. To model 
the ZEV, I allot 10% of the new market share to ZEVs after 2025, rising to 
30% in 2030, and 100% in 2040. 
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• Currently, municipalities have the option of adopting or ignoring lower 
stringencies of the Step Code. Higher levels of the Step Code will not 
become mandatory until 2032 when they will be instituted as a minimum 
requirement for the B.C. Building Code. To model the provincial building 
code with the introduction of the Step Code, I slowly phase out high-
emission building technologies and prevent them from taking any market 
share after 2030. 
• To model the RNG mandate, I assume that natural gas suppliers can 
source enough biomethane to meet their 15% target by 2030 in their 
natural gas stream. Biogas processed into biomethane is chemically 
nearly identical to conventional natural gas. Thus, I assume that there is 
no blend wall between the two fuel types. 
• To further reduce emissions associated with natural gas extraction, 
production and transport, the government committed to a 45% reduction 
of methane emissions in the industry by 2025. I assume that natural gas 
industries will begin to phase out high-emission technologies and replace 
them with the least-cost low-methane alternative. I assume that the sector 
will move towards leak detection and repair technologies to reduce 
methane leakage, with more effective technologies becoming available 
over time. I phase out gas production pathways in CIMS that do not 
include leak detection and repair programs and prevent them from taking 
any new market share by 2020. 
• The provincial government has also committed to provide subsidies for 
home appliance upgrades and retrofits. The government currently offers 
residents a $1200 rebate for converting their electric resistance heating 
system to an electric heat pump and $2000 for converting their oil, 
propane, and natural gas furnace heating systems to an electric heat 
pump. For simplicity, I assume a subsidy of $2000 for all new electric heat 
pumps. 
There are several action items in the current policy package that are not detailed 
enough to be executed in CIMS. For example, the government aims to provide a 
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regulatory framework for carbon capture and storage, including new direct air capture 
innovations. It does not specify any policies that require carbon capture and storage. 
However, policies that increase the costs of GHG-emitting technologies may induce 
increased carbon capture and storage as they become a viable solution in a stringent 
policy environment.  
4.2.1. Current and Announced Policies + Carbon Pricing (CAP + 
Carbon Pricing) 
To bridge the gap between the current policy package and the emissions target, I 
raise the carbon price from its announced level of $50/tonne CO2e by 2022 until B.C. 
meets its emissions reduction targets for both 2030 and 2050. In modeling policy runs 
that meet the emissions targets, I make implicit assumptions about jurisdictions outside 
of B.C. Decarbonizing the economy is likely to create a rise in production costs if 
emissions-intensive trade-exposed industries are subject to carbon pricing or regulations 
of rising stringency. Without carbon tariffs on imports and carbon subsidies to exports 
(called border carbon adjustments) to keep domestic and foreign goods at relatively the 
same cost, industrial output in B.C. is likely to fall. Thus, I assume that Canada and the 
rest of the world begin to pursue similarly ambitious climate targets, or that Canada 
implements policies that reduce the cost impacts for B.C. industries. These policies 
would keep the cost of foreign produced goods unchanged relative to domestic 
produced goods, thereby leaving domestic and export demand mostly unchanged. 
4.2.2. Current and Announced Policies + Flexible Regulations 
(CAP + Flexible Regulations) 
My final simulation also bridges the gap between the CAP policies and the 2030 
and 2050 emissions targets. I adjust the stringencies of each regulation to approximate 
the GHG reductions in each sector that would occur under a single, economy-wide 
carbon price. My assumptions about the rest of the world’s actions are identical to those 
I make in the CAP + Carbon Pricing scenario. 
Some sectors are regulated by more than one policy. For example, the personal 
transportation sector experiences emissions reductions from both the ZEV mandate and 
the LCFS. Where there is policy overlap, I only change the stringency of the policy with 
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more potential compliance pathways, or “flexibility.” For example, in the case of personal 
transportation, I increase the LCFS to meet emissions targets and leave the ZEV 
mandate as announced by the government. For the most part, I rely on regulations that 
already exist as part of B.C.’s current climate policy. 
 In summary, I make the following policy assumptions under this run: 
• To decrease transportation emissions, I increase the LCFS beyond what 
was specified in the current policy package. To approximately match the 
carbon price scenario, I impose different percentage reduction rates for 
gasoline and diesel. 
• To decrease the emissions of industrial sectors, I model industrial 
emission intensity standards, which require each industry to reduce its 
emission intensity until sectoral emissions match those of the CAP + 
Carbon Pricing run. To model the emission intensity standards, I assume 
that prices of high-emissions outputs rise as facilities with high abatement 
costs subsidize the production of facilities with low abatement costs by 
buying credits from them as necessary. I assume that the credit trading 
market for each industry clears in every timestep. These standards, when 
modeled, produce an outcome that is nearly identical to an Output-Based 
Pricing System (OBPS). The OBPS creates a price signal for emissions-
intensive trade-exposed (EITE) industries by charging industries for 
emissions above an allowable amount. Each industry’s allowable 
emissions are determined using an output-based standard. Although the 
policies are not structured in exactly the same way, they create similar 
cost changes in the model and consequently similar outcomes. 
• To reduce emissions in the biofuel and hydrogen production sectors, I 
assume a phase-out of production technologies that consume fossil fuels 
and replace them with technologies that consume either electricity or 
biofuels. As I model relatively few biofuel production pathways, this could 
represent either an upstream performance standard or a more flexible 
emissions intensity standard. 
40 
Chapter 5. Results and Discussion 
5.1. Provincial results 
The provincial emissions targets specify a 40% reduction in GHG emissions by 
2030, a 60% reduction by 2040, and an 80% reduction by 2050, relative to 2007 levels. 
This is equivalent to reducing emissions to 39Mt CO2e in 2030, 26Mt CO2e in 2040, and 
14Mt CO2e in 2050. Absent the current policy package, emissions continue to rise 
(Figure 2 Provincial emissions trajectories by policy run. CAP + Carbon Pricing and CAP 
+ Flexible Regulations meet the emissions targets.. The Low LNG scenario of BAU 
projects emissions rising to 64Mt CO2e by 2050, while the High LNG scenario projects 
emissions rising to 68Mt CO2e by 2050. Under BAU, a portion of natural gas extraction 
GHG emissions are captured and stored, which reflects acid gas disposal practices that 
currently occur throughout B.C. and includes some CO2 along with the targeted acid 
gases (B.C. Oil & Gas Commission, 2018). Without targeted carbon capture and 
storage, natural gas extraction contributes an additional 12MtCO2e under a Low LNG 
scenario, and 17MtCO2e under a High LNG scenario, which would more than double the 
sector’s emissions. This demonstrates the importance of capturing emissions should the 
province proceed with LNG expansion. With the implementation of CAP, emissions in 
2050 fall to 46Mt CO2e under a Low LNG scenario and to 48Mt CO2e under a High LNG 
scenario. By design, both CAP + Carbon Pricing and CAP + Flexible Regulations 
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In terms of emissions reductions, each CAP + Flexible Regulation run matches 
its corresponding carbon pricing run closely. It is possible to meet the emissions targets 
with every policy package intended to do so, indicating that policymakers in B.C. have 
multiple policy pathways to meet their goals. 
5.1.1. Carbon pricing stringencies 
With the addition of increased policy stringencies, it is possible to meet the 
emissions reductions targets in CIMS with either carbon pricing or flexible regulations 
regardless of whether there is a Low or High LNG scenario in place. Past EMRG 
researchers have postulated that CIMS overestimates the necessary carbon price due to 
its lack of complete macroeconomic equilibrium feedback. Vass (2016) estimated that 
the carbon price necessary to drive emissions reductions in CIMS is approximately 25% 
higher than the price necessary with the macroeconomic feedbacks included. With this 
adjustment, the carbon price (in 2020 dollars) in the Low LNG scenario must be driven to 
$190/tonne CO2e to meet the 2030 emissions target and up to $775/tonne CO2e to 
meet the 2050 target. To meet the 2030 and 2050 targets in the High LNG scenario, the 
carbon price must rise to $260/tonne CO2e and $775/tonne CO2e, respectively. 
The natural gas sector is a key factor in setting the carbon price. The carbon 




























Figure 2 Provincial emissions trajectories by policy run. CAP + Carbon 
Pricing and CAP + Flexible Regulations meet the emissions targets. 
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High LNG scenario, owing to greater production of natural gas and liquefaction for 
export. By 2030, the sector is only partially decarbonized; a higher 2030 carbon price is 
necessary in the High LNG scenario to decarbonize the sector enough to meet the 
emissions target. As the price rises, the natural gas extraction sector decarbonizes its 
entire production cycle. By 2050, the carbon price approaches similar levels in the High 
LNG and Low LNG scenarios. Once the levelized costs of zero-emission technologies 
exceed those of high-emission technologies, the price does not have to rise beyond the 
rate necessary to combat inflation. I discuss the decarbonization of the natural gas 
extraction sector further in Section 5.4. 
It is challenging to predict how the carbon price will rise beyond 2030, as society 
will likely develop alternative emissions reductions technologies in the intervening years. 
For example, Carbon Engineering has piloted direct air capture technology with 
estimated costs ranging from $93-232/tonne CO2 (Keith et al., 2018). If such a 
technology can be applied at a massive commercial scale this would reduce abatement 
costs substantially. I chose not to model such alternatives as their wide-scale 
deployment remains highly uncertain. 
5.1.2. Flexible regulation stringencies 
While a carbon tax is usually applied across the economy, the regulations in CAP 
+ Flexible Regulations vary in application and stringency. In CAP + Flexible Regulations, 
the emissions intensity of fuels in 2030 must fall 13% lower than the level the 
government has proposed as part of its current policy package (Table 4). As mentioned 
earlier, blended diesel can result from substituting low-emission hydrogenation-derived 
renewable diesel (HDRD) for fossil fuel-based diesel without a blend limit, which 
facilitates emission intensity reduction in the diesel stream. The proportion of biofuels in 
blended diesel rises much more quickly but is limited by HDRD availability. The RNG 
mandate impacts every sector that makes use of natural gas. The current and perhaps 
future relatively high cost of producing biomethane incentivizes a switch to electricity in 
most sectors, probably negating the need for an RNG mandate that reaches 100% 
stringency. 
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Table 4 Stringencies for the LCFS and RNG mandate under CAP + Flexible Regulations. Stringencies are 
shown for both the High and Low LNG scenarios.   
CAP + Flexible 
Regulations Stringency 
(Low LNG) 
CAP + Flexible 
Regulations Stringency 
(High LNG) 
Regulation Requirement 2030 2050 2030 2050 
LCFS gas % intensity reduction 33% 72% 33% 73% 
LCFS diesel  % intensity reduction 40% 95% 40% 90% 
RNG Mandate % biomethane 
minimum content 
36% 82% 39% 87% 
 
As natural gas is only a small portion of energy consumption in most industrial 
sectors, the emissions intensity standards do not vary between LNG scenarios (Table 5). 
As a reminder, I model the emissions intensity standards by increasing the cost of 
technologies proportional to their emissions per unit of output. I model a separate 
regulation for each industry. These standards produce an outcome similar to an OBPS in 
a scenario where the rest of the world undertakes strong climate action. Thus, the 
intensity standards that I provide below could represent the emissions benchmarks used 
in the OBPS in addition to industrial emissions standards. 








Industrial Minerals 21% 21% 
Metal Smelting 46% 81% 
Chemical Products 56% 77% 
Pulp and Paper 11% 45% 
Mining 67% 79% 
Petroleum Refining 18% 70% 
Other Manufacturing 9% 49% 
Coal Mining 4% 9% 
Petroleum Crude 32% 35% 
  
While I created these emissions intensity standards as a regulation order to 
complete my CAP + Flexible Regulations package, the OBPS has already been 
introduced at the national level. Aside from a broad-based carbon price, B.C. has 
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several options for inducing emissions reductions in industry, including intensity 
regulations and subsidies. 
5.1.3. GHG emissions by sector 
Emissions by sector were relatively similar across all policy packages that 
achieve the emissions targets (Figure 3), regardless of the LNG scenario. For this 
reason, I only display the Low LNG scenario in Figure 3. In general, there are few 
differences between CAP and the target-achieving runs leading up to 2030. The lack of 
variation between runs is indicative of how challenging it is to decarbonize an economy 
within a relatively short, 10-year timeframe. Many technologies have a lifespan longer 
than 10 years, which prevents rapid decarbonization via changes in capital stock. 
However, currently operating diesel freight trucks can easily switch to a diesel blend with 
greater HDRD content, allowing for some decarbonization without having to retire ICE 
trucks before the end of their lifespan. Thus, much of the difference between CAP and 
the target-achieving runs occurs in the freight transportation sector.  
The additional two decades between 2030 and 2050 allows for greater turnover 
of capital stock as long-lived technologies retire, creating more opportunities for 
decarbonization. As a result, there is more variation in 2050 across all sectors when 
comparing CAP with target-achieving runs. Emissions are substantially lower than CAP 
under target-achieving runs in most sectors (the exceptions being agriculture and waste, 
which do not experience additional regulation in line with current exemptions in these 
sectors). Cumulative industrial emissions remain the highest of any sector due to their 




Figure 3 2030 emissions by sector for each policy run in a Low LNG scenario.  
Transportation sector results 
I separate my discussion of transportation into personal transportation and freight 
transportation. The additional natural gas demands of a High LNG scenario have little 
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impact in these sectors in CIMS; the following results apply to both Low and High LNG 
scenarios unless otherwise noted. I present figures for the Low LNG scenario only. 
5.1.4. Personal transportation sector 
The personal transportation sector in CAP sees the largest drop in sector 
emissions relative to BAU. The emissions reductions in CAP are largely driven by a shift 
from ICE motors to EVs, PHEVs, and hydrogen vehicles (Figure 4). Emissions from 
personal transportation decrease 64% from 2005 levels with the implementation of the 
ZEV mandate and the LCFS. Personal vehicles transition largely from ICE motors to a 
combination of EVs and PHEVs by 2050. EVs dominate the personal vehicle market in 
2050 in all runs. The remaining emissions from this sector come from ICE motors 
purchased before the ZEV mandate reaches its maximum stringency (100%) in 2040. 
Target-achieving runs create further emissions reductions in this sector. The carbon 
price in CAP + Carbon Pricing increases the levelized costs of ICE vehicles, reducing 
2050 emissions by 88% relative to 2005 levels. CAP + Flexible Regulations has a similar 


























































































































The ZEV mandate, modeled in CAP as well as in the target-achieving runs, has a 
strong influence on which vehicles dominate the market. Most of the variation between 
runs occurs before the ZEV mandate stringency rises to 100% in 2040. As EVs, PHEVs, 
and hydrogen-powered vehicles have relatively high levelized costs, these vehicles 
generally do not take up more of the market than is mandated by the policy. E-85 
motors, which do not count as a ZEV, also play a role in decarbonizing this sector. E-85 
motors (commonly known as FlexFuel vehicles) can combust either gasoline or any 
blend between 0% and 85% ethanol. The capital costs of E-85 vehicles are very close to 
those of standard ICE vehicles and these vehicles are now available throughout North 
and South America (Posada & Facanha, 2015; U.S. Energy Information Administration, 
2020). They become increasingly competitive in runs that push up the price of gasoline 
relative to other types of fuel. The LCFS and the carbon price do just that, spurring an 
increase in E-85 vehicles in the market that burn mostly ethanol. Under target-achieving 
runs, most of the market share that is not taken up by ZEV vehicles is taken up by E-85 
vehicles. Under all runs save BAU, demand for ethanol peaks in 2035 before the ZEV 
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CAP + Flexible Regulations
Gas Ethanol Hybrid
Electric Plug-In Hybrid Hydrogen
Figure 4 Total personal vehicle market share for each policy run. Note that "Ethanol" 
represents only E-85 motors that actually consume ethanol, as E-85 vehicles can 
consume both ethanol and gasoline. E-85 vehicles that consume gasoline are included 
under “Gas.” 
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EVs eventually come to dominate the market, overtaking PHEVs. Under the 
current legislation, plug-in hybrids (PHEVs) qualify as partial ZEVs while electric vehicle 
(EV) motors and hydrogen motors qualify as ZEV vehicles. Although ZEVs must receive 
a specific proportion of the new market share, they still compete amongst themselves. 
Plug-in hybrids have the advantage of being able to use solely electricity (thereby 
qualifying as a ZEV), or gasoline once its smaller battery has been depleted. They can 
have their gasoline tanks filled in minutes from well-established refueling infrastructure, 
mitigating some of the inconvenience associated with ZEVs. However, the LCFS will 
push up the price of gasoline, resulting in slightly higher levelized costs for PHEVs 
relative to the BAU run. Under CAP, the LCFS stringency does not increase after 2030. 
As a result, PHEVs have a total market share of 17% by 2050.  The driving policies 
behind CAP + Carbon Pricing (the carbon tax) and CAP + Flexible Regulations (the 
LCFS) both increase the cost of gasoline, making PHEVs less cost-competitive over 
time. Target-achieving runs have a lower percentage of PHEV total market share 
(between 12% - 15%). 
Although hydrogen motors qualify as ZEVs, there is little to no hydrogen uptake 
in any run. Hydrogen vehicles have the highest capital costs, even with technological 
developments, as well as added financial and convenience costs due to a lack of 
refueling infrastructure. The production and distribution of hydrogen is more expensive 
than that of electricity, although refueling a hydrogen motor is much faster than charging 
a battery. Indeed, intangible costs are a factor hindering the uptake of all ZEV vehicles, 
including hydrogen, and these account for the perceived risks associated with adopting 
new technology. Creating additional scenarios to factor in accelerated hydrogen 
innovations and direct government support of refueling infrastructure was deemed 
outside the scope of this research. 
Fuel switching is not the only available decarbonization mechanism. Mode 
switching – changing the type of transportation – may also play a role in decarbonizing 
this sector. Under a high carbon price or a stringent flexible regulation, someone might 
choose to take transit or carpool instead of driving alone. My simulations did not show a 
dramatic shift away from personal vehicle use. Vehicles have many advantages in terms 
of trip flexibility and comfort and establishing effective non-vehicle transportation options 
in low-density areas is costly. Furthermore, any decrease in congestion because of 
mode shifting away from vehicles increases the attractiveness of vehicle use by lowering 
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vehicle travel times, thus reducing the full effect of the shift (Coulombel et al., 2019; 
Hymel et al., 2010). For these reasons, personal vehicles continue to play a major role in 
CIMS’s personal transportation sector out to 2050. 
5.1.5. Freight transportation 
I divide the discussion of freight decarbonization into two sections: truck and 
other types of transportation (rail, marine, and air). 
Truck transportation 
Truck transportation comprises the greatest portion of freight emissions. Without 
additional policies, decarbonization in this sector is less substantial than in the personal 
transportation sector. Emissions under the CAP run are 4% lower than those of the BAU 
run by 2050, as the LCFS forces a steady decrease in emission intensity before being 
frozen at its 2030 level. Target-achieving runs see a rapid increase in biofuel 
consumption that peaks in 2050 (Figure 5). CAP + Carbon Pricing increases the 
levelized cost of diesel, prompting an increase in conventional biodiesel blending and 
HDRD consumption. Under CAP + Flexible Regulations, the price of blended diesel 
increases as suppliers spend resources to either decarbonize their fuels, resulting in a 
very similar composition of fuels across runs that achieve the targets. This suggests that 
the LCFS, when designed carefully, is a reasonably economically efficient policy for 
reducing freight transportation emissions. 
Truck freight transportation is mainly decarbonized through a transition to 
biofuels (Figure 5). Under target-achieving runs, conventional biodiesel comprises 15% 
of total fuel consumption, while HDRD rises to 34% of consumption. By 2050, HDRD 
becomes the dominant fuel for freight truck transportation in target-achieving runs, 
comprising 64% - 67% of total fuel consumption by trucks. As mentioned in Chapter 3, 
HDRD does not have the same “blend wall” restrictions that prevent biodiesel and 
ethanol from becoming larger portions of their respective blends (Natural Resources 
Canada, 2012), although it is more costly to produce. Using HDRD allows the sector to 
decarbonize without replacing trucks before the end of their lifespan. Consequently, its 
use becomes the dominant decarbonization mechanism for freight trucks. This result is 
consistent with other studies that explore the decarbonization of freight transportation 
with similar policies (Hoyle, 2020; Vass, 2016; Vass & Jaccard, 2017).  The life-cycle 
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emissions of HDRD are reduced as a response to stringent compulsory policies, further 




Implementing stringent climate policy affects the relative cost of fuels (Figure 6). 
Under a carbon tax, the price of a fuel rises in proportion to its emissions intensity. 
Under the LCFS, diesel suppliers must either decarbonize to the benchmark, or buy 
credits from firms who over-comply or create Part 3 agreements. Both options will 
impose a cost on the supplier, also in proportion to their fuel’s original emissions 
intensity. The transfer of funds from under-compliant firms to firms with credits has the 


























































































































































































































































CAP + Flexible Regulations
Low LNG
Diesel Biodiesel HDRD
Figure 5 Total fuel consumption for road freight transportation under all runs.  
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Flexible Regulations between 2030 and 2035. However, it is uncertain if such a drop will 
occur if it becomes difficult to meet demand for biofuels. A limitation of this study is that I 
did not model supply costs for increasing HDRD use and am therefore unable to reflect 
how prices for HDRD might increase or decrease in response to increasing demand. 
Supplying increasing amounts of HDRD to meet demand is likely to get more 
challenging and therefore more costly. Should HDRD supplies prove inadequate, 
suppliers may need to turn to the other alternatives to decarbonize freight trucks. 
 
Figure 6 Changes in blended diesel and conventional diesel prices under each policy 
run. Note that blended diesel includes HDRD and conventional biodiesel. 
 
Electric and hydrogen truck motors are available in CIMS as an alternative to ICE 
truck motors. However, their capital costs are far higher than their ICE equivalents. Even 
when accounting for cumulative experience and technological improvements, their 
annualized costs are higher than equivalent ICE motors. Electric motors in medium- and 
heavy-duty freight suffer from the same refueling inconveniences as their light-duty 
counterparts. Recent innovations such as overhead catenary vehicles (already used to 
power buses in some municipalities) and dynamic induction vehicles – which are 
charged via electric coils implanted in the road – would alleviate the burden of having to 
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would require costly charging infrastructure along most, if not all, of their intended route 
in order to be feasible. Similarly, hydrogen motors would require a considerable 
expansion of refueling infrastructure before they can be utilized for freight transport 
(Moultak et al., 2017).  
It is difficult to determine the role of electricity and hydrogen in this sector given 
considerable uncertainty in the pace of potential technological improvements. Sufficient 
advances in electric and hydrogen-powered freight vehicles and infrastructure may yet 
make them the logical option for firms seeking to decarbonize their fleets. Thus, a 
decarbonized freight sector could utilize electricity, hydrogen, or biofuels as the 
dominant fuel type, or any combination of the three. I only model one decarbonization 
pathway out of many possibilities and I did not model a scenario that assumed support 
for accelerated deployment of these early-stage technologies. 
Rail, marine, and air transportation 
Rail, marine, and air transportation comprise a smaller portion of freight 
transportation emissions than trucks but are more challenging to decarbonize as they 
operate internationally and are vulnerable to competition from less regulated 
jurisdictions. These modes of transportation can only be fully decarbonized by climate 
policies under the assumption that other jurisdictions will be taking similar levels of 
climate action, thus increasing their own costs to the same degree and limiting changes 
in competitiveness. Otherwise, the government may need to provide carbon subsidies or 
some other form of relief to vulnerable sectors until this is the case. The carbon tax in 
CAP + Carbon Pricing and the LCFS in CAP + Flexible Regulations drive down 
emissions in these modes of transportation. Rail is mostly electrified by 2050, and there 
is a small increase in biodiesel blending in air and marine transportation. 
As mentioned in the scenario assumptions, I turned off CIMS’s macroeconomic 
functions in this modeling exercise. As a result, the overall demand for freight 
transportation (i.e. all modes combined including air, marine, road, and rail transport) 
does not decline in any simulation. However, rail and trucks compete to meet demand 
for freight transportation by land. As stringent climate policies increase the levelized 
costs of ICE trucks, road freight decreases 8% by 2050, while transportation by rail 
increases by 5%. Under target-achieving runs, rail is 27% electrified by 2030 and 85% 
electrified by 2050, which is why an increase in rail transportation towards 2050 does not 
53 
contribute substantially to emissions. Attempts at rail electrification have been made in 
North America since the early 19th century, but the decline in fossil fuel prices made their 
continued operation economically unsound (Allen & Newmark, 2018). These results 
suggest that ambitious climate policy is likely to spur renewed interest in rail 
electrification. However, road transport has the advantage of being more flexible than set 
rail routes and will probably remain the dominant method of land freight transportation.  
The volume of freight transportation may change depending on the stringencies 
of industrial and freight decarbonization policies in neighbouring jurisdictions and how 
they affect B.C.’s imports and exports, but the magnitude of this effect is difficult to 
determine. Further research with a general equilibrium model might provide more insight 
into how climate policies in other jurisdictions will impact demand for freight 
transportation in B.C. 
5.1.6. Comparison with the Navius Research study 
Because Navius Research has also modeled the effect of B.C.’s current policies, 
I am able to examine their study’s technological and sectoral results and compare them 
against my own. Navius Research used their general equilibrium model, gTech, to 
determine the outcomes of the current policy package. GTech’s represented economy is 
assumed to grow by a certain percentage of GDP. Unlike CIMS, which relies on 
exogenous demand forecasts, economic growth in gTech can change endogenously 
depending the impact of policies on production costs. However, as policies under both 
studies are intended to have minimal effects on vulnerable industries, their results are 
similar. 
Navius Research (2017) indicated that implementing the current policy package 
would result in B.C. reducing its emissions 30% by 2030, or a 19MtCO2e reduction. In 
this study, I estimate a 15MtCO2e reduction by 2030 under a Low LNG scenario and a 
13MtCO2e reduction under a High LNG scenario. Freight transportation accounts for 
most of the difference in GHG reductions between my study and the Navius Research 
study.  
Navius Research estimated that emissions from freight transportation under their 
CAP run would be approximately 8.2 MtCO2e by 2030, down from 13.2MtCO2e in their 
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BAU run (Table 6 Comparison of freight transportation emissions between Navius 
Research study and this study.. Under my CAP run, I find that the freight transportation 
sector would produce approximately 14.3MtCO2e emissions by 2030 in both LNG 
scenarios. This difference (6.1MtCO2e) is larger than the cumulative difference between 
the studies; it is offset by several sectors in my study that produce slightly less (less than 
1MtCO2e) emissions than comparable sectors in Navius Research’s study. The bulk of 
the difference can be attributed to greater heavy-duty vehicle decarbonization and rail 
decarbonization in Navius Research’s study. 











    Heavy-Duty Vehicles 8.8 5.4 11.1 11.0 
    Railways 0.8 0.0 0.5 0.5 
    Domestic Navigation 1.8 1.5 1.8 1.7 
    Off-Road Vehicles 1.8 1.3 1.1 1.1 
 
Unlike CIMS, the Navius gTech model calculates transportation demand 
forecasts endogenously, as demand from other sectors changes in response to climate 
policies. Demand for each mode of transportation in gTech grows steadily, much like the 
exogenous forecast used in CIMS (Table 7). This suggests that a reduction in transport 
demand as a result of climate policies is not a factor in the difference between our two 
studies.  
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Table 7 Demand growth forecast comparison between the Navius Research study and this study. Note that 
Navius Research presents their demand forecasts indexed to their calibration year of 2010. I present CIMS's 
demand forecast the same way for comparison purposes. 
gTech Mode Type 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 
Heavy-Duty Vehicles 1.00 0.93 1.25 1.54 1.87 
Transit 1.00 1.15 1.31 1.45 1.63 
Air 1.00 1.37 1.33 1.44 1.54 
Rail 1.00 1.07 1.39 1.62 1.78 
Other Transportation 1.00 1.03 1.03 1.15 1.25 
Overall growth in CIMS6 1.00 0.87 1.01 1.12 1.22 
 
Given that declining demand for freight transport is not likely to play a role, I 
attribute the difference in freight GHG reductions to several other factors:  
• Navius Research’s study adds minimum market share mandates to the 
transportation sector, requiring that 10% of new market share in heavy freight 
transportation be allocated to electric motors and an additional 16% to natural 
gas motors. Electric buses are allocated 94% of new market share in transit by 
2030. While the CleanBC document discusses incentive programs to increase 
the market share of zero-emission freight trucks and buses, it did not explicitly 
commit to any policies, compulsory or otherwise. For this reason, I do not model 
these minimum market shares. 
• In the Navius study, use of clean energy7 in freight trucks rises from 9% of energy 
consumption in the reference scenario to 40% of energy consumption under the 
CAP scenario. In my study, electricity and biofuel consumption rises to about 
15% of total energy consumption for trucks. Likewise, rail in the Navius Research 
study shifts completely to clean energy by 2030 but does not transition at all 
 
6 Individual transportation modes in CIMS generally follow this same growth pattern and thus are 
not displayed here. However, rail and heavy-duty vehicles in CIMS compete to service land freight 
transportation demand and can see changes in mode share as a result of different policy runs. I 
discuss this further in Chapter 5. 
7 In their 2017 methodology publication, Navius Research provided model forecasts for electricity 
and biofuel consumption in aggregate as “clean” energy. I aggregate my electricity and biofuel 
consumption results in the same way in this section for comparison purposes.  
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under CAP in my study. The slower energy transition in my study results in fewer 
GHG reductions relative to the Navius study.  
o There is likely a difference in technology capital costs that contributes 
to a slower energy transition and thus a lower level of emissions 
reductions in this sector. GTech derives the values for marine freight 
and all air transportation from past parameterization work done for 
CIMS but relies on a large body of academic literature and grey 
literature to parameterize trucks in the freight transportation sector. 
Capital costs for low-emission alternatives may be lower, leading to 
lower estimates of freight GHG emissions. Without knowing the exact 
values used in the gTech study, it is difficult for me to estimate how 
much this factor contributes to the difference in GHG reductions. 
Other small differences arise (generally less than 1MtCO2, some less than 
0.5MtCO2) in other sectors, owing to differences in input data, forecast assumptions, 
and modeling methodology. In addition to modeling B.C.’s policies for their study, Navius 
Research also modeled the implemented and announced policies of the rest of the 
Canada. I have not accounted for the actions of other jurisdictions in the same way and 
thus expect some discrepancies in estimated reductions. For a numerical comparison of 
this study’s emissions projections and the Navius Research (2017) projections, see 
Appendix B.  
5.2. Building sectors 
Buildings in CIMS are separated into two sectors: residential and commercial. 
Although both sectors rely on natural gas for some of their services, the differences 
between the High LNG scenario and Low LNG scenario are too small to attribute to any 
one factor with certainty. Thus, I report results for the Low LNG and High LNG scenarios 
together unless otherwise noted. 
5.2.1. Residential sector results 
The main decarbonization mechanism under all runs is a transition from natural 
gas to electricity. Natural gas is the main energy source for the residential sector in 
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historical years (2005-2015). CAP + Carbon Pricing reduces residential emissions by 
98% in 2050 relative to 2005 levels, while CAP + Flexible Regulations reduces 
residential emissions by 92% by 2050. The high-stringency RNG mandate under CAP + 
Flexible Regulations causes a shift towards electrification of residential services. The 
increase in natural gas costs due to biomethane content incentivizes consumers to shift 
towards electricity-powered technologies. CAP + Carbon Pricing creates a similar effect 
with the carbon tax, increasing natural gas costs until many consumers switch to 
electricity. 
As a reminder, CAP implements a rising carbon tax, the Step Code, and the 
renewable natural gas mandate to decarbonize residential buildings. The cost of 
biomethane combined with the carbon tax makes gas-burning technologies less 
competitive than those running on electricity. High-emission HVAC is to be slowly 
phased out as part of the Step Code’s mandatory introduction in 2032. Assuming that 
the government follows through with its (currently non-binding) commitment, electricity 
use rises from 35% of total energy consumption in 2005 to 76% in 2050. Under runs that 
meet the targets, electricity comprises approximately 90% of all residential energy 
consumption use by 2050. 
Natural-gas consuming technologies are slowly phased out in runs that meet the 
emissions targets. Heat pumps (an electric space-heating technology) are the dominant 
furnace technology under both CAP + Carbon Pricing and CAP + Flexible Regulations, 
comprising 88% of the furnace total market share by 2050. Cooking ranges and water 
heaters under both target-achieving runs are increasingly electricity-powered, but natural 
gas-consuming technologies remain viable for some households in 2050 in all runs and 
scenarios. 
5.2.2. Commercial sector results 
The commercial sector experiences trends in emissions reductions that are 
similar to those of the residential sector. Historical fuel use in the commercial sector is 
largely split between electricity and natural gas. Under CAP, emissions fall by 25% in 
2030 and by 40% in 2050 from 2005 levels. Electrification drives emissions reductions, 
rising to 59% of total energy consumption by 2050. Under CAP + Carbon Pricing, 
electricity rises to 98% of total commercial energy consumption by 2050. Under CAP + 
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Flexible Regulations, electricity rises 93% - 98%. The target-achieving runs achieve 
approximately 95% emissions reductions relative to 2005 levels. 
The greatest source of emissions in the commercial sector is HVAC services. In 
historical years, natural gas powers most HVAC services. Policies at their CAP 
stringencies are not sufficient to push levelized costs for electric HVAC lower than those 
of natural gas HVAC. Under runs that meet the emissions targets, HVAC transitions 
increasingly towards electricity. CAP + Carbon Pricing causes electric HVAC to rise to 
98% of the total market share by 2030 under both LNG scenarios. CAP + Flexible 
Regulations also incentivizes an increase in electric HVAC to 90% of the total market 
share. Blended natural gas holds the remaining market share and the share of 
conventional natural gas decreases gradually as a result of the RNG mandate. 
Other building technologies are also replaced with their electric counterparts 
under stringent climate policy. Hot water heating by natural gas is replaced by electric 
heating in all runs, except BAU. Under runs that meet the emissions targets, total market 
share in 2050 for electric hot water heating ranges from 74% to 95%. Cooking ranges 
are also a small part of commercial emissions. Under all runs, electric cooking ranges 
eventually dominate the market as blended natural gas becomes more costly due to its 
biomethane content. The highest market share, 97%, of electric cooking ranges by 2050 
occurs under the CAP + Carbon Pricing. It can be observed from CAP + Carbon Pricing 
that the most economically efficient mechanism in the commercial sector would be to 
transition services to consume electric alternatives. 
A key uncertainty of this study is the pricing of biomethane. I did not model a 
supply curve for biomethane, which would describe the cost of biomethane for a given 
level of production. A supply curve would add another layer of economic realism to the 
simulation by creating a feedback between the cost of biomethane production and the 
quantity demanded. Electrification under an RNG mandate could be slower or faster 
than what I have modeled, depending on the resulting price of blended natural gas. 
However, the shape of a supply curve for biomethane is highly uncertain. I therefore 
instead set the biomethane price conservatively high to approximate the high prices that 
could result from increased demand and limited feedstock availability. The increasing 
stringency of the RNG mandate further disincentivizes consumption of blended natural 
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gas; as such, biomethane consumption peaks at 6% of total energy consumption despite 
being a growing proportion of the blend. 
5.3. Industrial sectors 
In this section, I refer to several sectors within CIMS: Chemical products, 
industrial minerals (encompassing production of materials such as cement, lime and 
glass), metal smelting (representing aluminum and nickel, among others), mineral 
mining, pulp and paper manufacturing, agriculture, petroleum refining, petroleum crude, 
and coal mining. I address natural gas extraction in a separate section. As natural gas is 
not a major part of any production process in these sectors, there is little variation 
between the two LNG scenarios. Thus, I only present figures for the Low LNG scenarios. 
 Most emissions in the industrial sectors arise from fossil fuel use for heat 
generation (via boilers or furnaces) and a small amount of emissions are from production 
processes (such as those emitted from the production of cement). However, fossil fuels 
only account for a portion of industrial energy use. Electricity comprises at least 36% of 
total energy share in 2050 in all runs, including BAU. Electricity use rises in every run 
under both LNG scenarios and replaces fossil fuel use for heat generation. Another large 
portion of total fuel use is biomass, which is mostly consumed by the pulp and paper 
sector for electricity generation and process heat. Under all runs, biomass use declines 
from its peak of 52% in 2015 due to gradually decreasing demand for pulp and paper 
products; it comprises between 41% - 45% of total energy consumption by 2050. 
The current policy package does not result in substantial emissions reductions 
from these sectors, even as the carbon price rises to its announced stringency. 
However, under the CAP run, emissions for all industrial sectors fall 29% below 2005 
levels by 2050. And under CAP + Carbon Pricing, 2050 emissions fall by 42%, while 




The transition from fossil fuels to electricity takes different forms depending on 
the industrial sector. For example, the metal smelting industry transitions from coal-fired 
and gas-fired furnaces to electric arc furnaces. Where there is no electric alternative, an 
option that utilizes carbon capture and storage eventually dominates the market. The 
key factor is that there is a zero-emissions alternative to the emissions-intensive 
technologies for most services in every industrial sector. These become cost-competitive 
when ambitious climate policy is applied. With further innovations it may become more 
cost-effective to fully decarbonize industry, but existing technology is adequate to meet 
the targets. 
This policy, as it is modeled, mimics the economic efficiency of a carbon price. 
However, it is limited by my assumptions on how the rest of the world will approach 
climate policy. Emissions intensity benchmarks can only be applied at this level if the 
rest of the world implements similarly stringent climate policies, thereby reducing the 
vulnerability of EITE industries to outside competition. Absent strong climate action in 
other jurisdictions, B.C. will have to implement policies to protect EITE industries, such 
as carbon tariffs. Additionally, I assume perfect credit trading between firms. Like the 
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Figure 7 2050 emissions by industrial sector the Low LNG scenario. 
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stringency in every country, in order to maximize credit trading opportunities and lower 
marginal abatement costs. Trading flexibility across jurisdictions may be especially 
important for B.C., as most industrial sectors in B.C. maintain just a handful of facilities 
each. B.C. might able to link such a system with the national output-based pricing 
system to increase economic efficiency. There is historical precedence for this kind of 
linkage; California and Quebec have had their cap-and-trade credit markets linked since 
2014. 
5.4. Natural Gas Extraction 
The natural gas extraction sector is responsible for a large portion of historical 
emissions (Figure 8). Emissions from the natural gas sector stem from its production, 
transportation, and processing. They arise either from methane leakage during one of 
these stages, or from natural gas that is combusted to power services such as heat or 
motive force. B.C. employs several natural gas extraction methods, with tight extraction 
(drilling underneath impermeable rock) and some shale extraction (fracturing shale 
formations) projected to form the bulk of extraction in the coming years. Under BAU, 
emissions in 2050 fall by 8% under a Low LNG scenario and rise 30% under a High LNG 
scenario. With the addition of CAP, emissions in this sector fall by 31% under the Low 
LNG scenario and by 10% under the High LNG scenario. Recall that CAP includes 
methane regulations that require firms to improve detection and repair of methane leaks, 
thus reducing emissions relative to the BAU scenario. The target-achieving runs induce 





Figure 8 Natural gas extraction emissions trajectories for all modeled policy runs. 
Trajectories presented for both High and Low LNG scenarios. 
 
The rising carbon price in CAP + Carbon Pricing incentivizes improvements in 
leak detection and repair beyond the original methane regulations included in CAP. Each 
extraction method employs increasingly aggressive leak detection and repair programs, 
which reduces methane leakage substantially. Natural gas extraction also requires heat 
production and motive force. Heat production becomes more efficient, while 
compressors and turbines are largely transitioned to their electric counterparts. Under 
CAP + Carbon Pricing, 84% of compressors are electric, while gas turbines are 
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aggressive leak detection and repair, as is processing. As a result of the industrial 
emissions standards, CAP + Flexible Regulations transitions technologies in the natural 
gas sector in a manner similar to CAP + Carbon Pricing. Compressor engines and gas 
turbines are overtaken by their electric counterparts, LNG compression consumes 
mostly electricity instead of natural gas, and aggressive leak detection and repair 
becomes the norm. 
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Chapter 6. Conclusion 
6.1. Summary of findings 
I had several objectives in conducting this research. Firstly, I aimed to evaluate 
the emissions reductions and economic impacts that would result from currently 
implemented and announced policies in British Columbia. Secondly, I wanted to model 
alternative pathways to reach the 2030, 2040, and 2050 emissions targets. Finally, I 
wanted to explore how LNG expansion would impact B.C.’s ability to meet its climate 
targets. I focused on policy pathways that would maximize four policy criteria: 
environmental effectiveness, economic efficiency, administrative feasibility, and political 
acceptability. I placed special emphasis on political acceptability by modeling a run that 
relied significantly on flexible regulations, a policy type that has seen less opposition 
than a pure carbon pricing approach in B.C. and other jurisdictions. I compared the 
technological, energy and emissions outcomes of each set of policies to determine how 
carbon pricing would influence the economy versus an equivalent set of flexible 
regulations. Through these objectives, I sought to further inform B.C.’s decarbonization 
strategy. 
In comparing a business-as-usual run, the current policy package, and policy 
runs that meet the emissions targets, I noticed several trends: 
• In both a High and Low LNG scenario, the current policy package will not 
meet the 2030 emissions target, although it does effectively reduce 
emissions in multiple sectors. There are multiple policy packages that can 
meet the 2030, 2040, and 2050 climate targets. 
• Under target-achieving runs, emissions fall more slowly in some sectors 
leading up to 2030 before dropping quickly through to 2050. This 
suggests that decarbonizing certain sectors, such as freight 
transportation, will prove challenging in the short term. 
• Biofuels play a key role in decarbonizing sectors that do not yet have 
electricity-powered alternatives at reasonable costs. In particular, HDRD 
demand rises in the freight transportation sector in all scenarios that meet 
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the climate targets. Future innovations in fuel alternatives that I did not 
consider for this study may decrease reliance on HDRD. 
• Policy runs that meet the emissions targets disincentivize natural gas use 
across sectors. The rising cost of blended natural gas in target-achieving 
runs diminishes domestic consumption considerably. 
• Without policies that severely restrict production and transport emissions, 
LNG expansion will increase B.C.’s GHG emissions substantially. It is 
possible to meet B.C.’s climate targets with an LNG expansion, but 
stringent climate policy is required to induce decarbonization of every 
aspect of the production process. 
Across sectors in CAP + Carbon Pricing and CAP + Flexible Regulations, 
technology and fuel use shares follow similar trajectories. This suggests that a package 
of flexible regulations can be designed to mimic the economic efficiency of a carbon tax. 
Additionally, most emissions reductions can be done with existing policies and 
technologies. While policymakers are not limited to existing policies in their mandate to 
reduce emissions, using existing policies may alleviate some administrative burden. 
My approach to creating the flexible regulations package was to be as 
economically efficient as possible. This required me to model policies tailored to each 
sector, particularly the industrial sectors. Policy work at the federal level on the OBPS 
suggests that such a tailored approach is possible. Moreover, a tailored approach does 
not necessarily entail a separate policy for each industry. Building credit trading 
mechanisms that allow facilities across sectors to trade with each other could be key for 
an economy as small as B.C.’s.  
This study focused primarily on four specific policy criteria. Policymakers may 
choose to emphasize certain policies over others due to their performance on criteria 
other than economic efficiency. While a few policies under the current package 
emphasize specific technologies (i.e. the ZEV mandate) and are therefore less flexible, 
they have to date gone largely unnoticed or uncontested by the public. Additionally, 
policies such as the ZEV mandate may provide other co-benefits, such as improved air 
quality (Kinnon et al., 2019). Subsidies, while economically inefficient, are often very 
popular amongst some constituencies. Policymakers will always have a broad range of 
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motivations for implementing policies. They are likely incorporating or weighing criteria 
differently from what has been done in this research. 
6.2. Limitations and future research 
My research had a specific goal of providing two policy alternatives that 
emphasized different policy types. Here I summarize some of the limitations of my study 
for future researchers to consider. 
1. While studies have found that regulations face less opposition than carbon prices 
(Rhodes et al., 2017), there is no guarantee that regulations at very high 
stringencies will go unopposed by the public. As the past three decades have 
shown, climate policies will need to be in place for decades to meet the climate 
targets, which is ample time for opponents to attack policies or vote in a new 
government that repeals them.  
2. To meet the climate targets in this study, I model runs that emphasize specific 
policy types. This is not to suggest that there are only two pathways to meet the 
emissions targets. 
3. Certain sectors, such as freight transportation, face significant uncertainty in terms 
of the pace and direction of technological advancements. Additional research into 
the role these uncertainties play in decarbonization could provide further insight for 
decision-makers. 
4. Finally, I do not simulate the emissions that result from the combustion of exported 
LNG. As I focus specifically on domestic emissions, LNG combustion falls outside 
the scope of my study. 
Energy-economy models are simplifications of a complex system, aimed at 
providing insight in ways that will be useful for changing or improving the system. While 
there are many ways to improve the way a model represents reality, many features and 
outcomes will be based on assumptions included. Additional research using a variety of 
models, tools, methods, and expert opinion will help further inform the conversation on 
effective climate policy in British Columbia. 
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Appendix A. Summary table of policies modeled 
Sector Policy Description CIMS 
Start Year 
Modeling Methodology 
Economy-wide Carbon Tax Broad price on CO2 
emissions for all 
products in the 
economy. 
2005 Applied a broad price to 
CO2 emissions. 
Natural gas extraction Methane 
Regulations 
Requires a 45% 
reduction in 
methane emissions 
from the natural gas 
extraction sectors. 
2015 Phased out new market 
share for production 
technologies that do not 
include leak detection 
and repair by 2025. 
RNG 
Mandate 
Requires a % of 
biomethane to be 
added to the natural 
gas supply stream. 
2020 Required a rising % 
minimum market share of 
RNG production 
technologies in place of 






Requires 10% of 
new vehicles sold in 
2025 be ZEVs. 
Rises to 30% by 
2030 and 100% by 
2040. 
2025 Separated ICE vehicles 
to compete separately 
from ZEV vehicles. Within 
the ZEV competition, 
created a representative 
ICE vehicle technology 
that requested services 
from the ICE competition. 
Forced the new market 
share of the 
representative ICE 
vehicle to decline over 
time. 










provides $3,000 for 
a fully electric 
vehicle or $1,500 




provides $5,000 for 
a fully electric 
vehicle or $2,500 
for a plug-in hybrid 
vehicle. 
2020 Created a proxy fuel to 
represent money 
provided by the subsidy. 
Assigned a portion of the 
“fuel” to technologies that 
will receive the subsidy. 
Added a negative fuel 













2010 Phase out of standard 
ICE vehicle motor and e-
85 motor.  
Personal & freight 
transportation 
LCFS Requires a 
decreasing 
emission intensity 
for fuels over time. 




specified per fuel 
stream. 
- Fuel providers that 
exceed the target 
generate credits, 
while providers that 
do not meet the 
target generate 
deficits and must 
purchase credits. 
- Projects that 
contribute to the 
decarbonization of 
the fuel stream may 
be eligible for a set 
number of Part 3 
agreement credits, 
which can also be 
sold to fuel 
providers. 
2010 Added an “LCFS fuel” 
attribute to each fuel 
production technology. 
The amount of “LCFS 
fuel” is anchored to their 
emissions per unit 
production. A price is 
applied to the LCFS fuel 
to simulate the price 
increase that would result 
from fossil fuel suppliers 
paying hydrogen, 
electricity, and biofuel 
producers for LCFS 
compliance credits. 
 
- The model is re-run at 
different LCFS fuel prices 
until a certain carbon 
intensity is achieved for 
the target years 
- This modeling method 
assumes an equilibrated 
credit trading market, with 
no excess Part 3 
agreements or a phase 










2010 Phased out the standard 






Requires a % of 
biomethane to be 
added to the natural 
gas supply stream. 
2020 Created a competition 
between a 
representative RNG 
technology and a 
natural gas technology 
to fuel building services. 
Both technologies use 
natural gas as a fuel, but 
the RNG representative 
technology is more 









Phase out of low-
efficiency technologies by 
2030 for the following 
services: 
- Air conditioning 
- Natural gas and 
oil furnaces 
- Standard building 
shells 
- Water heating 
- Lighting 
Motive power 






Provides $1,200 to 
convert and electric 
furnace system to a 
heat pump and 
$2,000 to convert 
an oil, propane, or 
natural gas system 
2020 Created a proxy fuel to 
represent money 
provided by the subsidy. 
Assigned a portion of the 
“fuel” to technologies that 
will receive the subsidy. 
Added a negative fuel 





electricity to be 
generated from 
zero-emissions 
sources by 2025. 
2010 Forced the phase out of 
all non-zero emission 
electricity production 
technologies. Allowed for 
potential electricity 
production from natural 
gas with CCS. 





intensity over time. 








sector reduce their 
emissions by x% 
from baseline over 
time. 




2020 I will structure this 
similarly to the LCFS 
above. I will add a proxy 
Fuel to All technologies in 
each sector and levy a 
price on that Fuel to 
induce changes in the 
technology mix over time. 
- As with the LCFS, this 
method assumes perfect 
trading of credits and no 
excess of credits. 
76 
Appendix B. Comparison of emissions with Navius 
Research Study 
Sectors in gTech and CIMS are not equivalent, and CIMS does not disaggregate 
its emissions to the same level as gTech. Here I report the values from Navius 
Research’s study exactly as they appeared in the methodology report and arrange the 
values from my own study to align as closely as possible. I report the 2030 emissions 
only; for results from the Navius Research study from 2010-2025, see their report, 
Supporting the development of CleanBC. 
Table 8 Reference case 2030 emissions comparison of Navius Research results and results from this study. 








Buildings and communities 8.6 9.9 9.9 
    Commercial and Institutional 2.3 4.1 4.1 
    Residential 3.3 4.1 4.1 
    Industrial Processes and Product Use 0.6 N/A N/A 
    Waste 2.5 1.7 1.7 
Transportation 22.0 27.7 27.9 
    Domestic Aviation 1.5 
    Light-Duty Vehicles 7.0 
    Heavy-Duty Vehicles 8.8 
    Railways 0.8 
    Domestic Navigation 1.8 
    Off-Road Vehicles 1.8 
    Industrial Processes and Product Use 0.3 
Industrial 29.6 21.7 24.7 
    Public Electricity and Heat Production 0.1 0.2 0.2 
    Petroleum Refining Industries 0.4 0.9 0.9 
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    Mining 0.4 0.4 0.4 
    Upstream Oil and Gas Production 10.9 11.7 14.0 
    Manufacturing Industries 4.5 1.1 1.1 
    Construction 0.1 N/A N/A 
    Agriculture and Forestry 0.5 N/A N/A 
    Pipeline Transport 1.2 Included 
under 
“Upstream 








    Fugitive Sources - Coal Mining 0.9 1.5 1.5 
    Fugitive Sources - Oil and Natural Gas 5.1 Included 
under 
“Upstream 








    Cement Production 1.3 1.3 1.3 
    Lime Production 0.3 
    Aluminum Production 0.7 1.0 1.0 
    Other Industrial Processes and Product Use 0.2 N/A N/A 
Agriculture 2.9 4.0 4.0 
    Enteric Fermentation Manure 1.8 
    Manure Management 0.5 
    Agricultural Soils, Burning and Fertilizer 0.6 





Table 9 CAP policy run 2030 emissions comparison of Navius Research results and results from this study. 








Buildings and communities 6.2 7.9 7.9 
    Commercial and Institutional 1.5 3.2 3.2 
    Residential 2.5 3.0 3.0 
    Industrial Processes and Product Use 0.6 N/A N/A 
    Waste 1.5 1.7 1.7 
Transportation 15.4 22.2 22.2 
    Domestic Aviation 1.5 
    Light-Duty Vehicles 5.5 
    Heavy-Duty Vehicles 5.4 
    Railways 0.0 
    Domestic Navigation 1.5 
    Off-Road Vehicles 1.3 
    Industrial Processes and Product Use 0.3 
Industrial 22.4 20.9 22.3 
    Public Electricity and Heat Production 0.1 0.2 0.2 
    Petroleum Refining Industries 0.3 0.9 0.9 
    Mining 0.3 0.4 0.4 
    Upstream Oil and Gas Production 7.0 10.1 11.5 
    Manufacturing Industries 4.0 1.1 1.1 
    Construction 0.1 N/A N/A 
    Agriculture and Forestry 0.5 N/A N/A 












    Fugitive Sources - Coal Mining 0.8 1.5 1.5 
    Fugitive Sources - Oil and Natural Gas 2.9 Included 
under 
“Upstream 








    Cement Production 1.3 1.7 1.7 
    Lime Production 0.2 
    Aluminum Production 0.6 1.0 1.0 
    Other Industrial Processes and Product Use 0.2 N/A N/A 
Agriculture 2.9 4.0 4.0 
    Enteric Fermentation Manure 1.8 
    Manure Management 0.5 
    Agricultural Soils, Burning and Fertilizer 0.6 
Total 43.9 51.0 52.4 
 
Differences in emissions may also stem from two other factors: 
LNG Emissions 
There is a small difference in LNG production emissions when comparing my 
study and Navius Research’s study. Navius Research added LNG emissions ex post, as 
they judged that the transfer of labour from the rest of the economy to LNG (holding 
population growth fixed) would reduce emissions to an excessive degree. Additionally, 
Navius Research did not run their policies under separate LNG scenarios. Their LNG 
production assumptions were provided by the provincial government. Since these are 
not public, I was not able to run the same assumptions for a closer comparison of my 
80 
study and Navius Research’s study. Under my Low LNG scenario, natural gas 
production emissions for my CAP run were approximately 1MtCO2e less than Navius 
Research’s CAP run in 2030. Under my High LNG scenario, emissions from my run 
were approximately 1MtCO2e higher than their run.  
Building Emissions 
2030 commercial building emissions in my study are approximately 1.5MtCO2e 
higher than Navius Research’s study. We use different sources to parameterize 
technologies in our studies. Most of the values parameterizing building technologies in 
the Navius Research study come from more recent sources than my study. Differences 
in capital, operational, and energy costs between the studies will contribute to the 
discrepancy in GHG reductions. Different assumptions concerning declining capital costs 
may also contribute to a difference in GHG emissions. Without knowing the exact values 
used in the Navius Research study, I cannot reasonably estimate how much these 
differences contributed to the overall discrepancy in building emissions. Apart from 
parameterization, these studies are relatively similar in terms of assumptions and 
calibration. We calibrate our emissions in this sector to the same set of data, although 
we calibrate to different years (Navius Research calibrates for 2005 to 2010 while I 
calibrate for 2005 to 2015). The policies we model leading up to 2030 are the same as 
well. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
